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xABSTRACT
The electric power grid is a cyber-physical system (CPS) that forms the lifeline of modern
society. Sophisticated control applications that constantly monitor critical power system vari-
ables, such as voltage and frequency, enable system operators to deliver reliable and high-quality
power. The advanced devices and communication infrastructure of the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system enable control applications ranging from substation-level
voltage control schemes to system-wide automatic generation control (AGC). However, inherent
cyber security vulnerabilities in the infrastructure put system operation at risk by providing
an attack surface to cyber threat actors. A smart attacker, that is, a cyber threat actor with
expertise in physical power system operation could cause severe damage to the power grid
infrastructure and its reliability by stealthily manipulating SCADA operation. This disserta-
tion explores such impacts to power grid operation from cyber attacks and more importantly,
introduces novel mitigation schemes to minimize or negate the impacts. It has two primary
components - risk modeling of coordinated cyber attacks and attack resilient control.
The first component of this thesis focuses on coordinated cyber attacks, that is, attacks
target multiple power system components simultaneously. The notion of spatial and temporal
coordinated cyber attacks and their impact on power system transmission infrastructure is in-
troduced. The impact from these attacks was captured in terms of traditional power system
stability metrics. The results reveal that these extreme events demand a rethink of both power
system planning and operations methods by way of including cyber-originated contingencies
within the scope. To this end, a systematic risk modeling framework is proposed as mitigation
to be used in power systems planning. The risk for a substation is modeled as the product of
the vulnerability of its SCADA infrastructure and the impact from its compromise. The vul-
nerability is obtained by modeling the SCADA network using Stochastic Petri Nets. Impact to
system reliability is quantified in terms of transmission line overloads and the resulting forced
xi
load shedding. The methodology is applied to a test power system and the attack vectors
are ranked according to risk. This methodology could therefore employed by system plan-
ners to evaluate infrastructural upgrade requirements and identify security enhancements. An
enhancement to the contingency analysis application is proposed as mitigation during online
operation. The proposed algorithm efficiently captures impactful coordinated vectors by sig-
nificantly reducing the number of cases to be evaluated. Results reveal the algorithm’s ability
to identify almost all impactful attack vectors for a line under review without the need for a
complete study.
The second component of the thesis explores the impact of data integrity attacks on power
system control applications. Specifically, the impact of data integrity attacks on Automatic
Generation Control (AGC) is examined and Attack-Resilient Control (ARC) is proposed as
mitigation. ARC for AGC proposes the use of physical system information to design algorithms
for detect and mitigation of cyber attacks. Specifically, model-based anomaly detection and
attack mitigation algorithm was developed for AGC using short-term load forecast data. The
performance of AGC was tested on a standard test system with and without ARC. The results
show that ARC for AGC is able to detect data integrity attacks, maintain system within
stability margins and enhance overall system security by providing defense-in-depth.
Future work includes expanding the risk analysis framework to include different types of
coordinated attacks and to compare impact expressed in different power system metrics. Miti-
gation of temporal coordinated attacks and transient stability analysis of spatial and temporal
attacks are also a part of future work. Finally, the attack resilient control framework should
be enhanced to differentiate abnormal measurements due to cyber attacks from legitimate
aberrations due to power system contingencies.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The modern day electric power system, or the smart grid as it is known, is the lifeline
of present day society. Power generated at remote locations is delivered to the end customer
through a complex network of transmission and distribution systems at high availability. The
system integrates power from a variety of sources ranging from coal power plants to modern-
day wind turbines and delivers to a wide-range of loads ranging from homes to industrial
loads. The North American electric power system consists of three primary interconnections
- Eastern Interconnect, Western Interconnect and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT). The power system operators of each interconnect are faced with the challenge of
not only adjusting power generation whenever a light switch is flipped on, but, also are required
to ensure the delivered power is of high-quality.
The North American Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a regulatory body that
enforces standards that have to be maintained by power system operators in North America [21].
These standards identify performance baselines for a wide range of power system operations
ranging from protection and control to communications. The performance of participating
entities is constantly reviewed and any deviation from normal is met with penalties.
Power system operators rely on sophisticated computing and networking infrastructure to
monitor and control critical power system variables to ensure conformance with these standards.
This infrastructure, called the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is
integral to efficient and secure operation of modern electric power grids. Early SCADA systems
had simple functionality such as remote indication of breaker status. However, the arrival of
microprocessor based relays enhanced the capabilities of SCADA systems by providing more
advanced control options. Recent advances in SCADA devices has taken its capability to
a whole new level. Devices such as smart meters and Phasor Measurement Units backed
2by corresponding developments in communication infrastructures have enabled a variety of
energy optimization and protection schemes. However, inherent vulnerabilities in the SCADA
infrastructure put system operation at risk by providing an attack surface to cyber threat
actors.
Present day power system SCADA control applications range from substation-level voltage
control schemes to system-wide automatic generation control (AGC). A smart attacker, that
is, a cyber threat actor with expertise in physical power system operation could cause severe
damage to the power grid infrastructure and its reliability by stealthily manipulating SCADA
operation. This dissertation explores such impacts to power grid operation from cyber attacks
and more importantly, introduces novel mitigation schemes to mitigate impact from cyber
attacks. The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the power and SCADA system architectures. Com-
mon vulnerabilities in SCADA systems are highlighted and potential attack vectors and im-
pacts to power system control applications are introduced. Existing security standards are
highlighted and future security requirements are introduced. Chapter 2 introduces coordinated
cyber attacks. The impact of these attacks is first demonstrated on a test power system. A risk
modeling framework is proposed as an oﬄine mitigation strategy to mitigate impact from these
attacks. Chapter 3 introduces the notion of temporal and spatial coordinated cyber attacks. An
online mitigation strategy is presented for defense against spatial coordinated attacks. Chap-
ter 4 focuses on the impacts of data integrity attacks on automatic generation control. The
notion of attack resilient control as a combination of domain-specific anomaly detection and
model-based automatic generation control operation is presented as mitigation. The thesis is
concluded in chapter 5 where future work is also identified.
1.1 Power Systems Architecture
Fig. 1.1 identifies players involved in the operation and control of the North American power
grid. The power grid is functionally divided into generation, transmission and distribution. The
generation component includes power plant assets such as coal, nuclear, and hydro that inject
the required power into the grid. The transmission component includes transmission lines and
3Figure 1.1 Smart Grid Cyber-Physical System View
other stability-related assets such as capacitor banks, that carry the generated power from
source to distribution networks. The transmission network is typically operated at voltages of
110 kV and above in order to minimize I2R losses. The distribution network, typically radial
and operated at voltages of 33 kV and below, is responsible for delivering power to the end
customers in the form of domestic and industrial loads. With the advent of modern day smart
grid technologies, distribution resources such as roof top solar have enabled energy production
even at the distribution level.
The power grid control infrastructure is hierarchical in nature with the Independent System
Operator (ISO) occupying the position of the master control center. The ISO is an overseer
of power system operations at the generation and transmission levels. Typical functions of an
ISO include maintaining grid reliability & security and supporting billing & market operations.
The wide-area SCADA communication network infrastructure supports the ISO in performing
these functions by enabling instantaneous communication with lower level control centers at the
generation, transmission and distribution levels; these control centers may in turn communicate
with local control centers at the substation level. These lower level control centers are entrusted
with implementing the operational set points identified at the ISO level through execution of
local control schemes and participation in system-wide control strategies. These control actions
ranging from sub-second protection applications to once-in-five-minutes generation dispatch,
4are largely determined by the ISO and are key to grid reliability and security. The ISO also
works closely with energy markets in day-ahead and real-time operations. During day-ahead
operation, the ISO provides markets with critical information such as load forecasts in order
to determine the generation and transmission utilities that will participate in operation the
following day. During real-time operation, markets keep track of generated, transmitted and
consumed power in order to calculate settlements and financial transactions.
1.2 SCADA Systems Architecture
The SCADA network is vital to modern day power system operation and control as high-
lighted above. It creates a closed loop control system between the control centers and the field
devices by enabling monitoring and control. Fig. 1.2 provides a closer look at how this control
is implemented. The physical power system components such as circuit breakers, are directly
connected to Intelligent Electronics Devices (IED). Modern IEDs are capable of functioning as
both sensors and actuators. They are also programmable, thus enabling system operators to
implement automation and logic at the device level. Through their sensing functionality, IEDs
notify Remote Terminal Units (RTU) about the state of particular power system variables they
are associated with. A substation may have multiple RTUs, each gathering data from multi-
ple IEDs. Information gathered includes status indicators for devices like circuit breakers and
analog measurements such as currents and voltage from transformers. Modern IEDs and RTUs
are Internet Protocol (IP) accessible [2]. They use an Ethernet interface and support TCP/IP-
based protocols. Some of the protocols supported are IEC 61850, DNP3.0, ICCP, UCA2.0
and Modbus [3]. These offers several advantages to system operators, most importantly, the
communication infrastructure is readily available from Internet Service Providers.
The information relayed by the RTUs is received in the control centers by SCADA servers.
The control applications running in the application server access the SCADA server for real-time
system information. Depending on the type of control center, the applications range from state
estimation at the ISO level to local voltage control at transmission substation-level. The system
operator is able to access post-processing information from application servers and determine
an appropriate control action. This control message is then relayed to the actuators in the
5IEDs through the appropriate RTU. In practice, utilities provide remote access capabilities to
vendors for maintenance and upgrade purposes. Similar access capabilities are also provided to
corporate offices of power utilities for market operations. These connections could be potentially
be used as backdoors by attackers to gain access to the SCADA infrastructure.
Figure 1.2 Schematic of a SCADA Network
1.3 Security Challenges in SCADA Systems
Power systems SCADA was originally intended to be operated in isolation using proprietary
software and communication protocols. Owing to this, functionality of SCADA software and
communication protocols took precedence over security during development. The demands of
newer control and market applications introduced the need for sharing information with other
6utilities or ISOs which required a wide-area communication infrastructure. SCADA-specific
communication backbones, using technologies such as optical fibers and microwave communi-
cation channels, were built for a lot of the applications. However, there are many applications
that employ the Internet infrastructure. For example, utilities usually leave a channel open
for vendors to remote into their networks for maintenance and upgrade purposes. Control
centers relay system operational data to utility business centers for market operations. This
dependence exposes the vulnerabilities of the SCADA infrastructure to threat actors, providing
them an opportunity to find a backdoor. Securing SCADA networks is a different challenge
when compared to their information technology counterparts. This section summarizes a sub-
set of well-documented shortcomings and challenges in SCADA management, configuration and
software [52, 25, 13].
1. Limited User Group - SCADA hardware and software tend to be used by a very small
group of system operators. As a result, they escape unrestricted dissection and scrutiny
that other commonly used software undergo. This minimizes feedback vendors receive
on the weaknesses in their product, leaving the door open for threat actors to exploit
undiscovered vulnerabilities.
2. Extensive Lifetimes - SCADA products tend to have long lifetimes of around 10-15 years.
As sophistication in cyber attack techniques evolve much faster, system operators are
left to defend against highly skilled attacks with obsolete technology. Relatedly, legacy
devices such as PLCs and RTUs are also resource-constrained. This also prohibits the
installation of any additional security features.
3. A > I > C - Next, system operators prioritize availability (A) of ICS over confidentiality
(C) and integrity (I). As the primary objective has been to eliminate any source of failures
that might affect end-to-end communication between the controller and actuator, the
adoption of security technologies such as encryption has faced resistance.
4. Patch Management - in ICS is a major challenge due to availability requirements of the
control and monitoring infrastructure. Utilities would also require a testing environment
7to assess the performance of the system post-patching and to eliminate unexpected be-
havior when systems go back online. The 2010 study by Idaho National Laboratories on
ICS vulnerabilities observed that even if operating system patches are regularly installed,
patches for 3rd party software used by ICS remain unfixed.
5. Cryptography - Many operations in SCADA systems use unencrypted communication
that exchange user credentials in plain text. Applications such as relay configuration
involve substation engineers logging on to relays in order to modify settings. This activity
typically uses protocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) for relay access and transfer of settings. A threat actor could make use
of freely downloadable network sniffing tools such as Wireshark [22] to steal credentials.
Although encryption seems to be an obvious choice to avoid such scenarios, it has the
following challenge. Many SCADA applications are time-critical. Protection schemes such
as the remedial action schemes (RAS) in power systems operate in the millisecond time-
scale. In such applications, the addition of security technologies could add unnecessary
communication delay and jitter that could be detrimental.
6. Improper Input Validation - The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Control
Systems Security Program (CSSP) has identified improper input validation by control
systems software as the biggest security weakness of ICS software [13]. Poor programming
practices could leave room for buffer overflow attacks that could potentially provide an
attacker an opportunity to execute attack code.
7. Lack of Integrity Checks - SCADA communication protocols and software lack or use
primitive data integrity checks. This means, a smart attacker could easily manipulate
monitoring messages to trick operators into believing in a false system state. This could
lead to unwarranted control actions that might jeopardize the stability of the physical
power system.
8. Lack of Authentication - Common SCADA communication protocols such as the DNP lack
authentication. This means that an IED or RTU receiving a control signal executes the
8command without verifying the message source. This provides adversaries an opportunity
to send rogue commands to SCADA devices, causing unexpected changes to power system
operation.
9. Access Controls - SCADA asset owners seldom follow the principle of least privilege while
defining user access to system resources and capabilities. All system users typically tend
to have comprehensive access to functionalities and resources. This weakness in security
configuration could give unauthorized users the same powers as system operators.
10. Password Management - Password management is a major challenge in SCADA sys-
tems. A typical power system substation would have hundreds of devices including IEDs,
RTUs, PLCs and other computers. Due to impracticalities associated with maintaining
a separate password for each device in the network, system operators typically resort to
using default vendor passwords. An adversary can easily obtain default passwords from
the Internet or device documentation to make malicious changes to device settings or
operation.
1.4 Smart Attacker
Attacks on SCADA systems can be classified into Smart Attacks and Brute-Force Attacks
[44]. This classification is based on the resources available to the attacker and level of expertise
in power system operation and control. A smart attacker is one who has knowledge a priori
on system operation and access to resources required to inflict a severe attack. With this
knowledge an attacker would be able to target a substation that is very vital in the power
grid. After a successful intrusion into the substation the attacker would have a wide range
of attack options that can be executed; for example, tripping breakers, changing transformer
tap settings, capacitor bank settings. If the attacker has expertise in the controls available to
him through the SCADA system, he would be able to choose an attack or a combination of
attacks to cause maximum damage. The attack-impact studies explored in this thesis consider
this type of attacker. It is assumed that the attacker possesses detailed knowledge on power
system operation and is able to construct attack vectors that strategically target power system
9reliability. On the contrary, a brute-force attack or a dumb attack would involve attackers with
no knowledge of system operation.
The sophistication of recent cyber attacks discovered in ICS has confirmed that the smart
attacker is a realistic threat. Firstly, post-mortem analysis of the Stuxnet malware has revealed
that the attack script has been specifically written for ICS with specific Siemens PLCs [17].
Secondly, it was also discovered that the attack targets specific critical control applications
within the control system environment. Specifically, the attack was scripted to reduce the
rotations per minute of a centrifuge used in the nuclear fuel enrichment process. This shows
that sophisticated attackers have thorough knowledge of not only the control and automation
computer systems and their vulnerabilities, but they also possess an understanding of the
dynamics of the physical system to ensure maximum impact.
The second classification of threats to SCADA is into Internal and External Threats [4].
Internal threats are attacks by personnel currently employed in the organization, who therefore
have greater physical access to SCADA system equipment confidential and critical information.
Attacks by an attacker who does not have physical access rights to the facility are classified as
external threats. The focus of this thesis is on external threats specifically directed at power
system operation and control.
Finally, attacks can also target a single component in the system or multiple components.
The former type is called an isolated attack and the latter is a coordinated attack. Attackers
coordinating with one another could attack the power grid at different locations. In combination
with the first two classifications, we list the following four different types of attacks on power
system SCADA.
1. External Isolated Brute-force Attacks: An example for this classification is an attacker
tripping a line in the power grid that is carrying only a small fraction of the demand.
Power could be rerouted to that segment of the load, without any load being shed.
2. External Isolated Smart Attacks: Consider a case where an attacker attacks a system at a
time when a section of the distribution system is shut down for maintenance and power to
a segment of the load is being rerouted. In this case, lines carrying the additional power
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to the load segment will be stressed. If the attacker could trip such a stressed line, it
could potentially lead to unserved load condition or possibly result in a system collapse.
3. External Coordinated Brute-force Attacks: An example of the third type of classification
is a group of attackers (or a single attacker) launching an attack on the system at different
locations without a well defined goal. Such an attack without intelligence could be nulled
by power system back-up and security measures.
4. External Coordinated Smart Attacks: The fourth type of classification involves a clear cut
goal to be attained, knowledge of the topology of the system and a good understanding
of system response to a contingency. This attack pattern can cause severe impacts on the
power system because it involves nullifying system defenses that are otherwise effective
against an isolated attack. Our work is focused on this classification of attack.
Based on the end goal of the attacker, attacks on power system SCADA can also be classified
into the following four types [23].
• Data Integrity Attacks: Attacks of this type involve manipulating the signals to spurious
values. Such attacks on measurement signals could force the control module to make the
wrong decision and the same on the control signal could force the actuator to incorrectly
modify the physical device.
• Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks: A DoS attack involves blocking the communication
between sensors and the control center. In such attacks, the control center will become
blind to any changes in the physical system. Hence, if the physical system requires
corrective control, a DoS attack could drive the system to instability. Similarly, a DoS
attack could also prevent a control signal from reaching the intended recipient, potentially
causing more damage to the physical system.
• Replay Attacks: Replay attacks involve the retransmission of legitimate control or mea-
surement packets. If the retransmitted control or measurement packet is unwarranted for
current system state, system stability could be impacted.
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• Timing Attacks: This attack is a variation of the DoS attack. Instead of completely
denying communication between the system and control, the adversary will introduce a
delay in signal transmission. In applications such as power systems protection, timing
delays could nullify the mitigation offered by the protection application.
1.5 Power System Control Applications and Security
As introduced earlier in this chapter, a power system is functionally divided into generation,
transmission and distribution. Each division employs a variety of local and wide-area control,
monitoring and protection functions in order to deliver reliable and high-quality power to
end users. In this section, we present a classification of control loops in the power system,
identifying communication signals and protocols, machines/devices, computations and control
actions associated with select control loops in each functional classification. A summary of this
information is provided in Fig. 1.3. In addition, this section also introduces potential attack
vectors that an adversary could employ against these control applications, also shedding light
on its impact to power system stability [45]. Table. 1.1 summarizes a list of different attack
types that impact specific control applications. Existing work in the literature has also been
identified wherever appropriate.
1.5.1 Generation Control and Security
The control loops under generation primarily involve controlling the generator power output
and terminal voltage. Generation is controlled by both, local and wide-area control schemes as
explained below.
1. Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) - This generator exciter control is used to improve
power system voltage stability by controlling the amount of reactive power being absorbed
or injected into the system [33] at the generation bus. A digital exciter control module
is connected to the plant control center via Ethernet and communicates using protocols
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such as Modbus and Ethernet Global Data [1]. This Ethernet link is used to program
the controller with desired voltage set-point values.
2. Governor Control - Governor control is the primary frequency control mechanism. This
mechanism employs a sensor that detects changes in speed that accompany disturbances
and accordingly alters settings on the steam valve to change the power output from the
generator. The controllers used in modern digital governor control modules make use of
MODBUS protocol to communicate with computers in the control center via Ethernet
[2]. As in the case of AVR, this communication link is used to define operating set-point
for control over the governor.
Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: AVR and governor control are local control loops.
They do not depend on the SCADA telemetry infrastructure for their operations as both
the terminal voltage and rotor speed are sensed locally. Hence, the attack surface for
these control loops is limited. Having said that, these applications are still vulnerable to
malware that could enter the substation LAN through other entry points such as USB
keys. Also, the digital control modules in both control schemes do possess communication
links to the plant control center. To target these control loops, an adversary could
compromise plant cyber security mechanisms and gain an entry point into the local area
network. Once this intrusion is achieved, an adversary can disrupt normal operation by
corrupting the logic or settings in the digital control boards. Hence, security measures
that validate control commands that originate even within the control center have to be
implemented. AVR and governor control are applications with similar characteristics.
Data integrity and timing attacks are effective against them. The effectiveness of DoS
and replay attacks depends on factors such as the state of the power system and type of
measurements that are being replayed.
3. Automatic Generation Control - The Automatic Generation Control (AGC) loop is a
secondary frequency control loop that is concerned with fine tuning the system frequency
to its nominal value. The function of the AGC loop is to make corrections to inter-area
tie-line flow and frequency deviation. The AGC ensures that each balancing authority
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area compensates for its own load change and the power exchange between two control
areas is limited to the scheduled value. The algorithm correlates frequency deviation and
the net tie-line flow measurements to determine the Area Control Error ; the correction
that is sent to each generating station to adjust operating points once every five seconds.
Through this signal, the AGC ensures that each balancing authority area meets its own
load changes and the actual power exchanged remains as close as possible to the scheduled
exchange.
Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: The automatic generation control relies on tie-line
and frequency measurements provided by the SCADA telemetry system. An integrity
attack on AGC could have direct impacts on system frequency, stability and economic
operation. DoS type of attacks might not have a significant impact on AGC operation
unless supplemented with another attack that requires AGC operation. Impact from
replay and timing attacks is not guaranteed. The following research efforts have identified
the impact of data corruption and intrusion on the AGC loop.
Esfahani et al. in [31] propose a technique using reachability analysis to gauge the impact
of an intrusion attack on the AGC loop. In [46], we develop an attack template that
appropriately modifies the frequency and tie-line flow measurements to drive the system
frequency to abnormal operating values. This work has been further developed to include
mitigation against data integrity attacks in the form of Attack Resilient Control [43].
Chapter 4 of this thesis describes this concept in detail.
Areas of future research include evaluating impacts of DoS attacks on the AGC loop in
combination with other attacks that trigger AGC operation.
1.5.2 Transmission Control and Security
The transmission system normally operates at voltages in excess of 13 KV and the compo-
nents controlled include switching and reactive power support devices. It is the responsibility
of the operator to ensure that the power flowing through the lines are within safe operating
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Table 1.1 SCADA Applications and Attack Options
SCADA Application Data Integrity DoS Timing Replay
Governor Control 3 H 3 H
Automatic Voltage Regulation 3 H 3 H
Automatic Generation Control 3 5 H H
State Estimation 3 5 H H
VAR Compensation 3 3 3 3
Wide-Area Monitoring Systems 3 3 3 3
Load Shedding 3 5 5 3
Demand Side Management 3 5 5 3
margins and the correct voltage is maintained. The following control loops assist the operator
in this functionality.
1. State Estimation - Power system state estimation is a technique by which estimates of
system variables such as voltage magnitude and phase angle (state variables) are made
based on presumed faulty measurements from field devices. The process provides an
estimate of state variables not just when field devices provide imperfect measurements,
but also when the control center fails to receive measurements either due to device or
communication channel malfunction. This gives the operator details on power flows
and voltage magnitudes along different sections of the transmission network and hence
assists in making operational decisions. The control center performs computations using
thousands of measurements it receives through the wide-area network. A good amount
of work has been done in developing techniques to detect bad data in state estimation
[30, 32, 20, 18, 36, 41]. These techniques provide good estimates of state variables despite
errors introduced by device and channel imperfections. However, they were not designed
to catch malicious data injected with intent.
Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: State estimation is affected by data integrity attacks.
These vectors have been explored in literature and they have been identified below. DoS
attacks are ineffective against state estimation as system operators typically use pseudo
measurements to cover for missing measurements. Timing and replay attacks, if designed
such that they escape existing bad data detection algorithms, can impact state estimation.
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Bad data detection in state estimation is well researched. However, these techniques
were developed for errors in data that appear due to communication channel or device
malfunctioning. When an adversary launches an attack directed at disrupting the smooth
functioning of state estimation, these techniques might not be able to detect the presence
of malicious data.
Liu et al. created a class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, that escape detec-
tion by existing bad measurement identification algorithms, provided they had knowledge
of the system configuration [29]. It was determined that to inject false data into a single
state variable in the IEEE 300-bus system, it was sufficient to compromise ten meters.
In [27], the authors verify that the impact from false data injection attack discussed in
[29] is the same as removing the attacked meters form the network. The authors also
propose a graph-theoretic approach to determine the smallest set of meters that have to
be compromised to make the power network unobservable.
Bobba et al. [8] developed a technique to detect false data injection attacks. The idea was
to observe a subset of measurements and perform calculations based on them to detect
malicious data. Xie et al. show that a successful attack on state estimation could be used
in the electricity markets to make financial gains [57]. As settlements between utilities
are calculated based on values form state estimation, the authors show that a profit of
$8/MWh can be made by tampering with meters that provide line flow information.
2. VAR Compensation - VAR compensation is the process of controlling reactive power
injection or absorption in a power system to improve the performance of the transmission
system. The primary aim of such devices is to provide voltage support, that is, to
minimize voltage fluctuation at a given end of a transmission line. These devices can
also increase the power transferable through a given transmission line and also have the
potential to help avoid blackout situations. Synchronous condensers and mechanically
switchable capacitors and inductors were the conventional VAR compensation devices.
However, with recent advancement in thyristor-based controllers, devices such as Flexible
AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) are gaining popularity.
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FACTS devices interact with one another to exchange operational information [56]. Though
these devices function autonomously, they depend on communication with other FACTS
devices for information to determine operating point.
Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: All four types of attacks are effective options against
the VAR compensation control loop. In [40], the authors identify a list of attack vectors
that could be used against Cooperating FACTS Devices (CFD). Though attacks such as
denial of service and data injection are well studied and understood in the traditional
IT environment, the authors provide an insight into what these attacks mean in a CFD
environment.
• Denial of Cooperative Operation: This is a DoS attack. In this type of attack, the
communication to some or all the FACTS devices could be jammed by flooding the
network with spurious packets. This will result in the loss of critical information
exchange and thus affect long-term and dynamic control capabilities.
• Desynchronization (Timing-based attacks): The control algorithms employed by
CFDs are time-dependent and require strict synchronization. An attack of this kind
could disrupt steady operation of CFDs.
• Data Injection Attacks: This type of attack requires an understanding of the com-
munication protocol. The attack could be used to send incorrect operational data
such as status and control information. This may result in unnecessary VAR com-
pensation and result in unstable operating conditions. Attack templates of this type
were implemented on the IEEE 9-bus system and the results are presented in [47].
3. Wide-Area Monitoring Systems - Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) based wide-area
measurement systems are currently being installed in the United States and other parts
of the world. The phase angles of voltage phasors measured by PMUs directly help in the
computation of real power flows in the network, and could thus assist in decision-making
at the control center. PMU-based control applications are yet to be used for real-time
control. However, [39] identifies control applications that could be enhanced by using
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PMU data. It is suggested that HVDC systems, FACTS controllers, and power system
stabilizers could benefit from wide-area PMU measurements.
PMUs use global positioning system technology to accurately time-stamp phasor mea-
surements. Thus, the phase difference between voltages on either end of a transmission
line, at a given instant, can be accurately measured by using this technology. Phasor data
concentrators combine data from multiple PMUs and provide a time-aligned data set for
a particular region to the control center. The NASPInet (North American SynchroPha-
sor Initiative) [11] effort aims to develop a wide-area communications infrastructure to
support this PMU operation. It is recognized that PMU-based control applications will
be operational within the next 5 years. Hence, a secure and dependable WAN backbone
becomes critical to power system stability.
Cyber Vulnerabilities - All four types of attacks are effective against WAMS.
1.5.3 Distribution Control and Security
The distribution system is responsible for delivering power to the customer. With the
emergence of the smart grid, additional control loops that enable direct control of load at the
end user level are becoming common. This section identifies key controls that help achieve this.
1. Load Shedding - Load shedding schemes are useful in preventing a system collapse during
emergency operating conditions. These schemes can be classified into proactive, reactive
and manual. Active and proactive schemes are automatic load shedding schemes that
operate with the help of relays. For example, in cases where the system generation is
insufficient to match up to the load, automatic load shedding schemes could be employed
to maintain system frequency within safe operating limits and protect the equipment
connected to the system. When the need arises, load is shed by a utility at the distribution
level by the under-frequency relays connected to the distribution feeder.
Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: Data integrity and replay attacks are impactful
against load shedding. Packets can be spoofed to trigger load shedding. DoS and timing
attacks don’t directly impact load shedding as these events occur very rarely.
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Modern relays are Internet Protocol (IP) ready and support communication protocols
such as IEC 61850. An attack on the relay communication infrastructure or a malicious
change to the control logic could result in unscheduled tripping of distribution feeders,
leaving load segments unserved. The outage that occurred in Tempe (AZ) in the year
2007 is an example of how an improperly configured load-shedding program can result in
large-scale load shedding [54]. The distribution load-shedding program of the Salt River
Project was unexpectedly activated resulting in the opening of 141 breakers and a loss
of 399 MW. The outage lasted 46 minutes and affected 98,700 customers. Though the
incident occurred due to a poor configuration management by the employees, it goes on
to show the impact an adversary can cause if a substation is successfully intruded.
2. Demand Side Management - Demand-side Management (DSM) is the process by which
utilities control the energy consumption pattern of their customers. The benefits of such
schemes include cost of energy reduction, integration of renewables and enhancement of
overall system stability. The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which is con-
structed using a network of smart meters located in consumer locations, is critical in
enabling this functionality. The devices typically communicate with higher-level control
devices using communication technologies like WiMax, WiFi and ZigBee. In a typical
DSM scheme, the higher-level controller would receive information from consumers about
devices that they would like to operate on a particular day. Based on system operating
conditions, the controller would then identify an optimal schedule for the appliances in
order to reap maximum benefit. For example, the controller could schedule the operation
of washers and dryers while there is high wind or solar penetration in the system. Or,
the controller could adjust the temperature settings on the thermostat to reduce system
demand and thereby, stress on the transmission/distribution infrastructure.
Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: Data integrity and replay attacks directly impact
DSM as domestic devices can be triggered on or off by such attacks. This may impact
stability of the system. DoS and timing attacks do not have an impact on DSM as this
is not a safety-critical application.
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The AMI infrastructure presents new security challenges to system operators as it sig-
nificantly increases the attack surface by providing multiple access points. Through the
smart meter, an adversary could potentially control the status of consumer appliances,
and thereby the system load. Such a scenario, in addition to causing inconveniences to
customers, could also potentially cause system-wide stability issues. For example, attack-
ers could significantly stress the transmission or distribution system infrastructure by
simultaneously turning on several consumer loads. A threat actor would also be able to
obtain information on consumer behavior patterns from smart meters. This information
could include aspects such as how long residents are away from their homes [34]. This
could potentially cause security and privacy concerns for individual consumers.
1.6 Current Standards and Efforts
As the severity of potential impacts of cyber attacks on power system reliability has become
evident, efforts are underway from electricity sector stakeholders to identify security require-
ments and best practices for future SCADA systems. These include enhancements to standards,
security practices and development of new technology to protect power systems. This section
highlights some of these efforts.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee (CIPC) of NERC was formed to advance
physical and cyber security of the North American power grid [37]. The most critical function
of the CIPC is to play an active role in the development of the NERC Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) standards. All entities associated with North American bulk power system
are required to follow these standards. This includes generator owners/operators, transmission
owners/operators and reliability coordinators, among others [58]. The NERC CIP standards
cover a wide array of topics pertaining to physical and cyber security. Cyber security standards
cover topics ranging from electronics perimeter security to incident reporting and response
planning. In addition to developing and constantly improving the CIP standards, CIPC also
creates working groups and task forces to manage and deliver specific objectives. Current ones
include the control systems security working group tasked with developing economic solutions
to incorporate security into existing control systems, the cyber security analysis working group
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tasked with analyzing security events impacting bulk power system facilities and the cyber
attack task force tasked with assessing impacts to power system reliability from coordinated
cyber attacks.
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed cybersecu-
rity guidelines (NISTIR 7628) for smart grid with the adoption of new technologies such as
Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI), Distributed Energy Resources (DER), and Phasor
Measurement Unit (PMU)-based Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) [35]. The stan-
dards divide the smart grid into seven functional domains ranging from bulk generation to
markets. Smart grid actors are identified in each domain. Actors include devices, systems
and software that exchange information to implement various control and monitoring applica-
tions. A logical interface is created when two actors communicate to execute applications. The
standards identify all anticipated logical interfaces in the smart grid infrastructure and specify
security requirements for each one of them.
The US Department of Homeland Security identifies the energy sector as one among other
15 critical infrastructures whose protection is critical to national security and economic vitality.
Through its ICS Cyber Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) program, DHS responds to and
analyzes control system security related incidents, performs cyber security assessments of ICS
products for vendors, evaluations for asset owners, malware analysis and coordinates responsible
disclosure of vulnerabilities in ICS products [38]. The ICS-CERT vulnerability database is
critical to the timely dissemination of ICS vulnerability information to vendors and power
system security personnel.
The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability has initi-
ated the Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) program to develop cybersecurity
solutions for energy delivery systems. The goals of the CEDS program are summarized below
in Table. 1.2.
The Energy Sector Joint Working Group has identified five strategies in order to realize
its vision - “By 2020, resilient energy delivery systems are designed, installed, operated, and
maintained to survive a cyber incident while sustaining critical functions.” These are summa-
rized in Table. 1.2. Strategy 1 pertains to building a culture of security among energy sector
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Table 1.2 Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity - Strategies [19]
No. Strategy Goals
1. Build a culture of security
• Periodically assess risk management principles
• Cybersecurity practices become reflexive
2. Assess and Monitor Risk
• Continuously evaluate vulnerabilities, threats,
risk and response
• Next-gen EMS applications that are threat-aware
• Operable during a cyber incident3
Develop and Implement New
Protective Measures to
Reduce Risk • Defense-in-depth
4. Manage Incidents • Detection, remediation, recovery and restoration
5.
Sustain Security Improvements
• Proactive and aggressive approach to security
• Collaboration between industry, academia, and
government agencies to advance cybersecurity
participants. As vulnerabilities even in the business network of a utility can be exploited to
target control system networks, it is essential for all stake holders to maintain a high standard
for cyber security. This strategy ensures that the security practices and consequences are con-
tinuously discussed and more importantly, carefully scrutinized whenever changes are made to
the system. By building a culture of security, cyber security practices also become reflexive,
thereby going beyond current trend of merely adhering to recommended standards.
Strategy 2 is concerned with assessing and monitoring system risk. The goal is to contin-
uously review security posture, including vulnerabilities, threats, risk and responses across the
cyber-physical domain. This would enable system operators to develop an understanding of the
system vulnerabilities and the impacts that may result if they are exploited. This process would
thereby enable the development of appropriate response mechanisms and mitigation strategies.
Strategy 3 emphasizes the need for new attack detection and mitigation applications to be built
into next generation EMS. The goal of this strategy is to provide defense-in-depth by adding
another layer of security in addition to traditional cyber security technologies. Also, the need
is for these applications is to be able function even during a cyber incident. The enhancements
should keep in mind the evolving nature of the cyber threat space.
Strategy 4 involves managing a cyber incident. This strategy calls for the development of
attack detection, remediation, recovery and restoration methods in order to minimize and if
possible, negate the impact from a cyber incident. Strategy 5 calls for sustained security im-
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provements through collaborative efforts between academia, industry and government. Com-
mitment of resource and identification of incentives for stake holders are highly recommended
in order to achieve this goal.
The solutions explored in this thesis are centered around strategies 2 and 3. In the first
component of this thesis, a risk modeling framework is developed for coordinated attacks on
power system infrastructure. The substation SCADA network and power system are appropri-
ately modeled to obtain risk. The coordinated attack vectors are ranked according to the risk
metric in order to identify a suitable risk mitigation plan. This framework is built around the
recommendations of strategy 2. In the second component, attack resilient control is proposed
for the detection and mitigation of data integrity attacks on automatic generation control. The
application, intended to function as a part of energy management systems, identifies malicious
data packets injected into the AGC and also offers an alternative when the sensors are compro-
mised. This solution captures the essence of strategy 3. The following section provides more
detail by summarizing the contributions of this thesis.
1.7 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows.
1. Cyber-threat-specific power systems planning - This thesis establishes that the threat of
coordinated cyber attack vectors demand a redesign of future power system planning
applications. It is shown that such attack vectors can severely impact the reliability
of power systems designed based on current day planning paradigm. A systematic risk
estimation framework is proposed. The framework introduces a methodology to study
the impact of contingencies that originate from cyber attacks. This framework is useful
in identifying shortcomings of a power system infrastructure and weaknesses in security
posture.
2. Cyber contingency analysis - The thesis introduces the notion of spatial and temporal co-
ordinated attack vectors. A novel methodology to efficiently identify coordinated attack
vectors during real-time system operation is proposed. The number of attack combina-
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tions to be evaluated by the EMS contingency analysis network application is significantly
reduced. Overall, system security is enhanced as impactful coordinated attack vectors are
identified quickly, enabling the system operator to identify cyber and/or physical system
mitigation.
3. Attack Resilient Control - This thesis introduces the concept of attack resilient control to
defend automatic generation control from data integrity attacks. Attack resilient control
is a combination of bad data detection and mitigation algorithms, designed using data
from the physical power system. This technique offers defense in depth by adding another
layer of security within the power system control application, in addition to traditional
host and network-based cyber security technologies. The proposed methodology provides
AGC with defense against data integrity attacks and thereby assists in maintaining system
reliability.
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Figure 1.3 Power System Control Taxonomy
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CHAPTER 2. RISK ANALYSIS OF COORDINATED CYBER
ATTACKS ON POWER GRID
Coordinated attacks are defined as attacks that systematically target multiple power system
components. The SCADA network provides adversaries with an opportunity to perform these
attacks as it offers an increased attack surface. Coordinated attacks, when smartly structured,
can not only have severe physical impacts, but can also potentially nullify the effect of system
redundancy and other defense mechanisms. Through coordinated attacks, a threat actor could
create the effect of losing a single high-capacity resource by strategically targeting multiple
low-capacity resources. In this thesis, the proposed mitigation addresses solutions at two levels
- planning and operations.
2.1 Framework for Coordinated Cyber Attack Mitigation
Fig. 2.1 presents a high-level view of the proposed 2-level mitigation strategy. The first
level solution consists of an oﬄine risk assessment framework for the cyber-physical system.
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of compromise of a substation and its impact
in power system reliability metrics. These parameters are obtained by appropriately modeling
the cyber and power networks using domain-specific software. The risk framework helps in
identifying infrastructural upgrade requirements to the power system and security enhancement
requirements to the cyber system. The risk framework also helps identify a list of critical lines in
the power system. This information is passed on to the cyber contingency analysis application
to be used in system operations.
Real-time system conditions could differ significantly from the conditions used in oﬄine
studies. Online analyses have to be performed to identify impactful coordinated attack vectors
26
Figure 2.1 Framework for Coordinated Cyber Attack Mitigation
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for current state. As real-world power systems contains thousands of lines, a comprehensive
brute-force study evaluating all possible attack combinations in impractical. The cyber contin-
gency analysis application proposed in this thesis, in addition to the list of critical lines, receives
real-time system information from SCADA and cyber security technologies. Based on this in-
formation, the cyber contingency analysis application is required to quickly and effectively
identify attack vectors. This approach is discussed in detail in chapter. 3.
The focus of this chapter is on level one of the two-level solution. The problem addressed
and contributions can be summarized by the following.
Problem Statement - To develop an oﬄine coordinated attack mitigation strategy that iden-
tifies weaknesses in power system infrastructure and cyber security posture.
Proposed Solution - A risk assessment framework, where risk is defined as the product of
probability of successful cyber intrusion and resulting power system impact, is proposed. The
probability of successful intrusion is obtained by modeling the SCADA network using Stochastic
Petri Nets. A SCADA network model protected by firewall, intrusion prevention and password
protection systems is considered. The power system is modeled using standard power system
simulation software and impact is estimated by load unserved after a successful attack. Attack
pairs were constructed using a combination of system generation and transmission lines and
their risk was evaluated. Studies identify scenarios where generation capacity, cyber vulner-
ability, and the topology of the grid together could be used by attackers to cause significant
power system impact.
2.2 Related Work
Analytical techniques to estimate the impact of cyber attacks on physical systems have
gained prominence in the literature in recent years. Research work in this area is not restricted
to power system SCADA alone, but has been extended to other domains like gas pipelines
systems.
Authors in [5] propose a novel technique to mathematically model firewall and password
protection mechanisms to obtain the probability of a successful attack using Petri Nets. In
[6], the author proposes effective metrics to estimate the physical impact of a cyber attack.
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However, the isolated attack plan in the above works do not take into account system reserve
capacities that can compensate for the loss in generation.
In [7], the authors capture a sense of coordinated attacks by attacking different power system
components, but do not incorporate system defense mechanisms in their attack plan. In [8], the
authors provide a comprehensive review of power system control actions during disturbances.
In [9] the authors propose a tool that, given an industrial network and a description of
vulnerabilities, detects possible concerns in the network for the application. In [10], the authors
propose the application of a two layer wireless sensor network to observe the condition of
transmission lines in a power system. In [11] the authors develop a model based design of
attack detection techniques to show how such a model of a computer and network system detects
cyber attacks. In [12], State Space modeling approach is employed for the representation of
coordinated attacks.
In [13] the author presents a view on the interdependency between critical infrastructures.
In [14], contingency analysis is performed to quantify the survivability of high consequence
systems based on attacker potential. In [15], the authors present statistical data on outage
occurrences. The authors of [15] and [16] also identify perceived threats and reasons for stress
on the power infrastructure. In [17] the author explains the complexity and challenges faced
by the power industry. [18] provides a detailed list of measures that could be employed to
enhance SCADA cyber security. [19] presents a 3-step process for the calculation of Mean
Time to Compromise to efficiently compare different security arrangements. [4] and [20] are
fine resources that provide insightful details on the operation of SCADA systems and their
vulnerabilities. [21] provides details on operations in an electrical substation.
The authors of [22] and [23] propose a security setup called the trust system that enhances
SCADA network security with minimal impact on the real-time application the network is
monitoring. In [24] the authors develop a test bed imitating the power distribution network
and present a set of scenarios that demonstrate the importance of information technology in
grid management. In [25], a framework based on defense graphs and influence diagrams is
presented to evaluate the security of cyber networks used in power system operation. [26]
classifies the power system into four operating states and also enumerates events that trigger
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transition between two operating states. In [27] and [28], the need for an intelligent power
system control mechanism is stressed upon and the authors explain the use of devices like
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) to satisfy the same purpose. In [29], authors analyze
existing key-management protocols to see if they satisfy security requirements of the SCADA
system. Additionally, the authors also propose a new scheme that is secure, supports message
broadcast and avoids bottlenecks.
In our work, we make use of separate techniques to analyze the cyber and power network.
However, there are a few integrated techniques available in the literature to estimate vulner-
ability in terms of metrics such as Loss of Load Expectancy (LOLE) and Energy Not Served
per Interruption (ENSI) (e.g. [6], [7]). The shortcoming of this approach is that it fails to
capture the parameters of cyber network on the value estimated of risk, such as topology of
the cyber network, type of security devices, security device settings (e.g. firewall rules), etc.
Our approach captures these aspects, effectively. Also, using a separate tool for cyber network
analysis gives us the flexibility to perform analysis on cyber networks with different configura-
tions and security mechanisms. Moreover, using separate techniques also equips us to evaluate
risk precisely, leveraging the existing models in both cyber and physical domains.
2.3 Coordinated Attack Scenario
Attack on Frequency Control System - The North American power system is functionally
divided into Balancing Authorities Areas (BAAs). Each BAA, formerly known as Control
Area, is maintained by a Balancing Authority (BA) - an entity responsible for maintaining
generation-load balance within the BAA. Adjacent BAAs are connected by transmission lines
(tie-lines) that facilitate power exchange for economic and reliable operation. As long as the
load-generation balance within the system is maintained, the frequency remains at its standard
value of 60 Hz. However, during contingency conditions such as the loss of a generating unit, the
system experiences frequency excursions. Following such a disturbance, power system frequency
drops below the nominal value of 60 Hz. Once this happens, various system defense mechanisms
kick in at different time instances in order to restore normal operating conditions. The following
is the time-sequence of system defense mechanisms, following the loss of a generator.
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1. At t = 0+ seconds, that is, immediately after the disturbance, generators closest to the
tripped generator will contribute to arrest the fall in frequency.
2. After this, the inertia of the other generators in the system contribute to arrest the fall
in frequency until t = 3− 4 seconds.
3. At t = 4+ seconds, generators equipped with governor control ramp up generation to
return the frequency to a steady-state value. However, governor control does not restore
frequency to 60 Hz.
4. After the operation of governor control mechanism, the AGC attempts to restore the
system frequency to 60 Hz.
An intelligent attacker would utilize the knowledge of this sequence to plan the attack.
If the attack plan includes actions to nullify the effect of mitigation strategies at every step
along the way, the physical impact caused would be severe. From an attacker’s perspective,
the attack is most successful when the amount of load unserved is maximum. The following
are details that might aid the attacker in creating the attack template.
1. Geographical location of load dispatch centers - If the load dispatch center is distant
from most generators in the system, it might become difficult to deliver power during
contingency situations, due to transmission constraints.
2. Generators with governor control enabled - Not all generating stations in North America
have active governor control. Hence, targeting generating units with active governor
control will affect system response during contingencies.
3. Largest generating units in the system - By operational settings, generating units with
larger MVA rating will have a greater influence on system recovery. When such units
are brought oﬄine, system mitigation is severely hampered. Units with large inertia also
contribute to arrest the initial decline in frequency. Targeting such units will have a
similar effect on the system.
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4. Time of the day - An attack performed when the system is under heavy loading conditions
will have maximum impact. This is because, the rate of decline of frequency is faster under
such conditions.
A sophisticated attacker would form an attack vector by carefully choosing targets based
on the above criteria. However, the overall impact of the attack depends on the success of
compromising each one of the targets. Depending on the number of substations successfully
compromised the impact of the attack can vary between zero to significant load shedding.
2.4 Risk Estimation of Coordinated Cyber Attacks
The process of risk estimation involves two separate sub-operations - determining the prob-
ability of a successful intrusion and the resulting physical impact on the system. It is essential
to perform separate analysis on the cyber and power network to evaluate these required pa-
rameters. Fig. 2.2 is a flowchart that represents the process of risk estimation. The model from
[5] is used for cyber network modeling and optimal power flow simulations are performed on
the test power system to determine load shedding required.
2.4.1 Cyber Network Modeling and Analysis
The cyber network model employed in this analysis is a network that consists of computers
that control components in the power system, Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), substation
servers, etc. The network is secured using a firewall protection system. Each computer is
secured using a password protection mechanism. It is assumed that a subject who is able
to log on to a computer will be able to control physical devices that are controlled by the
computer. Also, it is assumed that the attacker is equipped with the technical knowledge
required to perform an intrusion. The probability of a successful coordinated attack depends
on the probability of successful intrusion into each of the substations. The probability of
successful intrusion into a cyber network mainly depends on the following factors:
1. The number of access points in the SCADA network (E.g.- Wireless access points, remote
log-in connections, etc.).
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Figure 2.2 Risk Modeling Procedure
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2. The strength of the firewall, intrusion detection systems and other network security
schemes.
3. The strength of passwords.
4. The rate of attack on the network.
Hence, for a given network configuration, there exists an associated probability of successful
intrusion depending on the above factors. The mathematical modeling tool Petri Nets, has been
employed to model the system and obtain the steady state probability for successful intrusion
[30], [31]. The Petri Net for a substation models both, the firewall and password protection
mechanisms.
2.4.1.1 Firewall Modeling
Figure 2.3 Firewall Petri Net Model (Adopted from [5])
Firewall logs are maintained by system administrators to analyze malicious behavior. Fire-
wall rules at most times are defined based on the type of protocol, IP address range, port
numbers and sometimes MAC addresses. Any violation of the rule set will result in the re-
jection of packets. However, intelligent attackers have been successful at finding a way past
the firewall. The probability of successful intrusion into a network protected by a firewall is
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calculated by using information from firewall logs. Hence, by looking at firewall logs, it is
possible to determine the probability of successful intrusion by identifying illegitimate packets
that went undetected.
The Petri Net model for a firewall, shown in Fig. 2.3, consists of n+1 immediate transitions
with an associated transition probability, where n represents the number of rules in the firewall
rule set.
The probability of a malicious packet going through a firewall rule policy j at firewall i is
given by
P fpi,j =
ffpi,j
Nfpi,j
(2.1)
where, ffpi,j is the frequency of malicious packets through the firewall rule j and N
fp
i,j is the
total record of firewall rule j in the logs. The probability of n of the n+1 immediate transitions
is computed using the above expression.
The probability of packets being rejected at firewall i by rule j is given by,
P fri =
ffri,j
Nfri,j
(2.2)
where, ffri,j is the number of rejected packets and N
fr
i,j represents the total number of packets
in the logs. The probability of the deny transition is calculated using the above expression for
each one of the firewall rules.
The Petri Net also has n delayed transitions associated with each firewall rule. These
transitions have the same rate λfi which is a function of the firewall instruction execution rate.
The transition with rate r1 represents the system response time which is the time taken by
system to respond after processing a log in attempt. The timed transition with rate r2 is the
firewall processing time for denying a packet.
2.4.1.2 Password Mechanism Modeling
The Petri Net for the password model shown in Fig. 2.4 consists of two immediate transi-
tions, one each for a correct and an incorrect password guess. The probability P pwi represents
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Figure 2.4 Password Petri Net Model (Adopted from [5])
the probability of a successful password guess. This probability is obtained using the expression:
P pwi =
fpwi
Npwi
(2.3)
where, fpwi is the number of successful intrusion attempts andN
pw
i is the number of observed
records in the log. The subscript i represents the computer system. The timed transition that
connects the place titled Wrong Guess and Log On Attempt represents the time taken to make
a next password guess after a wrong guess.
2.4.1.3 Cyber Network to Petri Net Equivalent Model Transformation
A given substation network configuration with firewalls and computers can be mathemat-
ically modeled using Petri Nets. Every firewall in the network is replaced with its Petri Net
equivalent model and every computer is replaced with the password Petri Net model. Fig. 2.5
demonstrates how a sample cyber network is transformed to its Petri Net model. The firewall
and computer are replaced with the Firewall and Password Petri Net models respectively. The
resulting Petri Net is called the Petri Net equivalent model of the cyber network. The prob-
ability of successful intrusion into the substation computer is obtained from the steady state
probability of the place Correct Guess being non-empty.
A coordinated attack pattern consists of two or more attackers working in conjunction. An
intrusion type coordinated attack is a success only when intrusions into all the substations in
the attack pattern is a success. The probability of a successful coordinated attack is a function
of the probabilities of successful intrusion into individual substations in the attack pattern. We
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Figure 2.5 Transformation from Cyber Network to Petri Net Equivalent
assume that the process of intrusion into each substation is an independent event. Therefore,
the probability of a successful coordinated attack is equal to the product of the probabilities
of individual attacks.
2.4.1.4 Cyber Network Simulation
Figure 2.6 Network Models A, B and C
The probabilities for successful intrusion into individual machines at three substation cyber
network models, namely, A, B and C were obtained. These are presented in Table 2.1. The
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cyber network is transformed to its Petri Net equivalent using the techniques described in
Section 2.4. Fig. 2.6 shows the three cyber network models. For an attacker to perform a
successful intrusion into a substation computer with network model A, it is assumed that the
he has to compromise a firewall and the computer’s password protection system. In model B,
it is assumed that the attacker would have to contend with a firewall, an Intrusion Protection
System (IPS) and the password mechanism. Like the firewall, an IPS is also a packet filtering
device and is modeled the same way using Petri Nets. In network model C the substation
computer is again protected with a firewall and an IPS, but with more stringent rules for
packet filtering.
In network models B and C the following method was used to model the firewall and IPS
in series. The output place of the firewall, Pout, becomes the input place of the IPS, Pin.
Place Pout of the IPS becomes the place Log On Attempt of the password Petri Net. The
system response time transition connects the password Petri Net to the firewall Petri Net. The
simulation model consists of five rules for both the firewall and the IPS.
Table 2.1 Substation Intrusion - Steady State Probabilities
Machines Model A Model B Model C
Mac1 0.0333 0.0130 0.0067
Mac2 0.0790 0.0081 0.0100
Mac3 0.0556 0.0123 0.0094
Mac4 0.0714 0.0118 0.0081
Mac5 0.0833 0.0101 0.0091
Table 2.1 shows the probability of successful intrusion into machines in all the three cyber
network models. The column titled Machines presents labels that are given to computers
in substations. The numbers in subsequent columns represent the probability of successful
intrusion into each of these machines for all the three cyber network models. Machines in
the same network model have different intrusion probabilities as a result of varying degree
of difficulty in password guessing. This difference between machines in the same substation
network is captured as varying probabilities in the password Petri Net model.
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2.4.2 Power System Simulation
The New England 39-bus system, shown in Fig. 2.7, was used as the test case to run optimal
power flow to obtain amount of load to be shed. The 39-bus system has 10 generating units
divided into three control areas, named 1, 2 and 3. Table 2.3 shows the amount of power
generated and the load demand in each control area. The difference between the total power
generated and total load, equal to 47.38MW, is attributed to transmission losses. Table 2.2
identifies generators with their capacities and the bus to which they are connected. The column
P Gen is the amount of power the unit generates under normal conditions. The column P
Limit represents the maximum generation of that unit and the column Control Area shows the
control area the generating unit is located in. Table 2.4 shows the loads that are present in the
system. The column P Demand is the amount of load in MW units. The bus to which they
are connected and the control area is also indicated.
Figure 2.7 The New England 39 bus System
Simulations were performed to determine the physical impact from both intelligent and
dumb coordinated attacks. The following sections provide intelligent and dumb coordinated
attack scenarios. The attack impact in each case is measured in terms of the required load
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Table 2.2 Generator and Capacities
Sl Bus Number P Gen (MW) P Limit (MW) Control Area
1 30 350.0 350 2
2 31 595.15 630 1
3 32 591.31 750 1
4 33 577.92 732 3
5 34 577.47 608 3
6 35 583.00 750 3
7 36 579.76 660 3
8 37 567.83 640 2
9 38 928.39 930 3
10 39 997.04 1100 1
Table 2.3 Control Areas - Generation and Demand
Control Area P Gen (MW) P Demand (MW)
Control Area 1 2183.5 1323.5
Control Area 2 917.83 1124
Control Area 3 3246.54 3853
Total 6347.87 6300.5
shedding (load unserved) for the OPF program to return a feasible solution. The OPF program
returns a feasible solution only if the online generation capacity is adequate to satisfy the
demand with the given transmission constraints.
2.4.2.1 Scenario 1 - Coordinated Attack Without Intelligence
A coordinated attack without intelligence is an attack whose primary and secondary attacks
have no significant impact on the system. Hence, a dumb coordinated attack would result in
either zero or a very small amount of forced load shedding. The following coordinated attack
cases are illustrations for dumb coordinated attacks.
Case 1: Two Transmission Lines - Simulation for this case is performed by tripping trans-
mission lines 16-19 and 21-22 in the New England system. If an OPF is run on the system with
the remaining online components, a feasible solution is still obtained. This is because of the
following factors. When transmission line 16-19 is tripped, the generation units connected to
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Table 2.4 Load Busses and Demand
Sl Bus Number P Demand (MW) Control Area
1 3 322.0 2
2 4 500.0 1
3 7 233.8 1
4 8 572.0 1
4 12 8.5 1
5 15 420.0 3
6 16 329.40 3
7 18 158.0 2
8 20 680.0 3
9 21 274.0 3
10 23 247.5 3
11 24 308.6 3
12 25 224.0 2
13 26 139.0 2
14 27 281.0 2
15 28 206.0 3
16 29 283.5 3
17 31 9.20 1
18 39 1104.0 3
busses 33 and 34 are isolated from the rest of the system. However, the generation resources in
the remaining system are adequate to satisfy the demand. Table 2.5 presents generator oper-
ating points before and after line 16-19 is tripped. It is observed that units 4 and 5 step down
from 577.92 MW and 577.47 MW to 340.79 MW and 342.01 MW, respectively. This is due to
the fact that when units 4 and 5 are isolated from the rest of the system, the only load they
serve is the one at bus 19. It is also observed that the generating units in the bigger section step
up to compensate for the deficiency created by the isolation of units 4 and 5. Further, when
transmission line 21-22 is tripped, the power that was delivered through it will be re-routed
through line 23-24. The power flowing through 21-24 changes from 409.23 MW with line 21-22
to 1074.31 MW when it is tripped. Hence, in this case, the system would be able to maintain
stable operating conditions by maintaining frequency within acceptable limits.
Case 2: Generation Unit-Transmission Line Combination - This is a case of a coordinated
attack pair that comprises of a generating unit and a line. The primary attack involves the
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tripping of unit 2. This results in the reduction of system capacity by 630 MW. However,
the demand is met by the remaining units. If line 16-17 is tripped as a secondary attack, the
system still remains in stable operating conditions as the bulk of the 204.79 MW that was
routed through line 16-17 will be re-routed through line 14-4. The power flowing through line
14-4 before line 16-17 is tripped is 288.86 MW and increases to 432.06 MW after the line is
tripped. Therefore, the system will be able to maintain stable operating conditions post-attack.
Table 2.5 Redispatched Generation
Sl Bus Number P Gen Before (MW) P Gen After (MW)
1 30 350.0 350.0
2 31 595.15 630.0
3 32 591.31 680.69
4 33 577.92 340.79
5 34 577.47 342.01
6 35 583.00 674.50
7 36 579.76 660.00
8 37 567.83 640.00
9 38 928.39 930.00
10 39 997.04 1100.0
2.4.2.2 Scenario 2 - Coordinated Attack With Intelligence
In this section, we provide results of coordinated intelligent attacks on generation only,
transmissions only and generation-transmission combinations. As in the case of attack without
intelligence, the coordinated attack template involves targeting two components at once.
Case 3: Generation Unit and Transmission Line - The following scenarios provide examples
for this kind of an attack. In the first illustration, the generator connected to bus 31 (unit 2)
is tripped and this results in a reduction of system capacity by 630 MW. If the OPF is run on
the remaining system, it will return a feasible solution with re-dispatched generation. Hence,
without a secondary attack, the primary attack has done no significant damage to the system.
As a secondary attack, line 3-4 is tripped. Under these system conditions, the OPF results in
an infeasible solution. In other words, with the remaining generation capacity, transmission
capacity and line constraints, the generation and load in the system can not be balanced.
Therefore, load shedding has to be performed in order to restore system frequency and regain
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stability. The following load shedding scheme is assumed. The loads directly served by a tripped
generator, that is, the loads that are geographically closest to a tripped unit will be shed first.
In this case, a load of 233 MW connected to bus 7 is closest to unit 2. Simulations reveal that,
a load of 110 MW will have to be shed for the OPF to return a feasible solution. Hence, it is
inferred that the above attack on the system will leave 110 MW of the load unserved.
A similar attack case involves the tripping of generation unit 1 (bus 30) and line 16-19.
This coordinated attack (Case 4 ) results in a total of 212 MW load unserved. The load, in
this case, was shed from busses 18 and 25.
Case 5: Two Transmission Lines - This type of coordinated attack involves the tripping of
two transmission lines. In the New England system, this scenario can be illustrated by tripping
lines 21-22 and 24-23. Though, the attack is targeted at transmission lines, it indirectly results
in isolating generating units 6 and 7, connected to busses 35 and 36, from the rest of the
network. In this case, load is shed from busses 15 and 16 as they are geographically closest to
the generators that were isolated from the system. A total of 200 MW and 163 MW is shed
from busses 15 and 16 respectively, to bring the system to stable operating conditions.
Case 6: Two Generation Units - The New England system has a total of ten generating
units and several combinations of generators can be listed for this attack scenario. An attack
on generating units 1 and 5, the smallest units in the system, results in a reduction of system
capacity by 958 MW. This clearly moves the system into unstable operating conditions as the
remaining generation capacity is insufficient to match the system demand and transmission
losses. As in the previous cases, load shedding is performed to bring the system back to stable
operating conditions. A load of 63 MW and 100 MW has to be shed from busses 18 and 20
respectively, and the OPF algorithm redispatches generation based on the new demand.
Table 2.6 compiles the load shed for the attacks described in this section. Case 5 has the
worst impact as it involves tripping of two transmission lines that isolate two high capacity
generation units from the system. Cases 1 and 2 are cases of coordinated attacks without
intelligence as they have no impact. The transmission line and generation combinations tripped
in these cases are compensated by other components in the system, resulting in zero load
unserved. Case 4, which involves the tripping of the smallest generating unit, still causes 212
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Table 2.6 Attack Combinations and Load Unserved
Case Primary Attack Secondary Attack Load Unserved (MW)
1 Line 16-19 Line 21-22 0
2 Unit 2 Line 16-17 0
3 Unit 2 Line 3-4 110
4 Unit 1 Line 16-19 212
5 Line 21-22 Line 23-24 363
6 Unit 1 Unit 5 163
MW of load to be shed. Case 6 involves the tripping of the two smallest generating units, unit
1 and 5, from the system and it results in forced load shedding of 163 MW.
2.4.3 Evaluation of Risk
According to assumptions, substations housing generating units 1 and 5 have cyber network
configurations Model A and Model C from Table 2.1, respectively. The coordinated attack is a
success only if intrusion into both the substations is a success. It is assumed that the process
of intrusion into both substations are independent events. This assumption is reasonable as
different power companies may use network security solutions and industrial control systems
equipment from different vendors. Therefore the probability of the coordinated attack is equal
to the product of probability of individual attacks. Assuming the breaker connecting generating
units to the grid can be controlled from machine Mac1 in the first substation and Mac2 in the
second substation, the probability of the coordinated attack, P (Z) is provided by the following.
P (Z) = P (A) ∗ P (B) = 0.0333 ∗ 0.0100 = 0.0003 (2.4)
Risk is provided by the product of the above probability and the impact caused by the
attack as identified below in Eq. 2.5.
Risk = P (Z) ∗ γ (2.5)
In the above equation, γ represents the physical impact (load unserved). For case 6 coor-
dinated attack on the New England 39-bus system, γ is 163. The risk is provided in Eq. 2.6.
Table 2.7, provides the risk of the system for each of the cases in Table 2.6.
Risk = 0.0003 ∗ 163 = 0.0489 (2.6)
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Table 2.7 Risk Estimate
Case γ Attack Probability Risk
1 0 0.0010 0
2 0 0.0008 0
3 110 0.0007 0.0770
4 212 0.0004 0.0848
5 363 0.0008 0.2904
6 163 0.0003 0.0489
The above results provide the following inferences. It is interesting to note that the the
coordinated attack with the highest impact on the system is not the one that targets the
generating units directly, but involves two transmission lines. This suggests that an intelligent
attacker could exploit critical links in the topology of the power system to cause more damage
than directly attacking generating units. Both case 3 and 4 are coordinated attack scenarios
involving a generating unit and a transmission line. Though case 4 involves the tripping of the
smallest generating unit with capacity 350 MW as opposed to 630 MW from unit 2 in case 3, the
impact from case 4 attack is greater than the one from case 3. This suggests that a coordinated
attack need not necessarily involve high capacity units to have a significant impact. This also
highlights the need for estimating the criticality of a system component in combination with
other components in the system.
Case 4 has a higher risk than case 3 despite having a lower probability of success. This is
because of the high impact a successful case 4 attack scenario produces. Though case 1 has
the highest success probability, along with case 2, it has zero risk. This is due to the fact
that a successful case 1 or 2 will result in zero forced load shedding. Hence, dumb coordinated
attacks have negligible risk that is either zero or very close to zero. Case 6 coordinated attack,
that involves tripping of two generating units, has the least risk. Though the physical impact
due to this attack is significant, the probability of attack success is small. This is expected as
substations housing generating units are expected to have stringent network security measures
and limited access.
45
2.5 Conclusion
In this work, we presented a systematic approach to evaluate the risk from coordinated
cyber attacks on a power system. Specialized techniques were used to evaluate the probability
of successful cyber network intrusion and impact on power system. The resulting risk due to the
coordinated attack was estimated. Different combinations of generation units and transmission
lines were combined to form coordinated attack pairs. The simulations revealed that important
factors that influence physical impact of an attack, among others, are the topology of the power
system, the location of the targeted generating substation and other generating substations,
and the criticality of the component in combination with other components in the system.
Other forms of coordinated attacks involving other system components could have an
equally severe impact. Our future work includes developing a systematic procedure to evaluate
the physical impact from coordinated attacks on any system. The aim is to develop an algo-
rithm that returns coordinated attack pairs as an output when provided with a system. The
aim is also to make the execution computationally inexpensive without a brute-force approach.
Our research also involves developing both cyber and power system mitigation techniques for
such attacks. Extending the coordinated attack model to systems like water distribution sys-
tems and oil & gas pipeline systems, to evaluate the impact of coordinated attacks is also a
part of our plan for future research.
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CHAPTER 3. ONLINE MITIGATION OF COORDINATED CYBER
ATTACKS
Chapter 2 addressed level 1 of the two-level strategy identified in Fig. 2.1. It focussed
on an oﬄine risk assessment strategy that helped identify shortcomings in cyber and power
infrastructures, in order to prevent impact from coordinated cyber attacks on transmission lines.
However, the challenge is that real-time system conditions could be significantly different from
all operation conditions considered during the oﬄine study. The evolving nature of threats
to critical infrastructure and unplanned changes in power system topology could render the
oﬄine mitigation strategies ineffective during real-time operation. This calls for additional
online measures that further enhance the security of the cyber-physical system. This chapter
focusses on level two of the solution towards mitigation of coordinated attacks. This chapter
also introduces the notion of spatial and temporal attack vectors targeting transmission lines.
It is shown that an attacker with knowledge of system operation may create attack templates
that exploit spatial and temporal dependencies in the system to create maximum impact.
Heuristics-based mitigation algorithms for spatial attack vectors are also proposed.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized by the following.
Problem Statement - To develop a cyber contingency analysis algorithm to identify impact-
ful coordinated attack vectors for online system conditions.
Proposed Solution - A heuristics-based cyber contingency analysis algorithm is proposed.
The goal of the algorithm is to efficiently identify a list of all impactful coordinated attack
vectors for a given line under study. Studies performed on the IEEE 118-bus system reveal
that proposed mitigation strategy is able to detect all impactful attack vectors for most cases.
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3.1 Spatial Attack Vectors
Spatial attack vectors are attack combinations where an adversary exploits locational de-
pendencies in the power system topology to create maximum impact. In this chapter, the
impact from spatial attack vectors constructed with tripping of multiple transmission lines
will be considered. The fictitious two bus system in Fig. 3.1 can be used as an example to
explain spatial attack vectors. The power generated by the generator is delivered to the load
through transmission lines 1 and 2. If line 1 is intentionally tripped through a cyber attack,
line 2 is overloaded. Protection systems monitoring line 2 will in turn trip line 2 in order to
prevent prolonged violation of its thermal rating. Similarly, in real-world systems, attackers
can strategically trip transmission lines of smaller rating in order to overload and trip critical
transmission lines.
Figure 3.1 Spatial Attack Vectors Example
Performance of the power system during contingencies is guided by the NERC transmission
planning standards (TPL). According to TPL-001, which outlines system performance during
a single element loss contingency (N − 1), system operators are required to maintain voltage
and thermal limits within acceptable ratings without any load curtailment. The TPL-002,
which outlines system performance requirements during events that result in the loss of two or
more components, places the same restriction on voltage and thermal performance, however,
permits controlled load shedding. In current practice, it is common for the contingency anal-
ysis application in the EMS to analyze all (N − 1) contingencies during real-time operation.
(N − k) contingencies are normally not analyzed due to low probability of occurrence and the
computational costs involved.
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3.1.1 Brute-Force Enumeration Complexity
A brute-force analysis of (N − k) contingencies involves enumerating all possible k combi-
nations of components and evaluating the impact from each combination. The following are
the steps involved in brute-force enumeration.
1. Identify every possible k-contingency combination. If there are a total of ′N ′ transmission
lines, the number of possible combinations is equal to
N ∗ (N − 1) ∗ (N − 2) ∗ ...(N − k) = O(Nk) (3.1)
For each possible combination, power flow calculations have to be performed in order to
identify system state after contingency. If each power flow requires ′P ′ seconds, the total
complexity to identify post-contingency system state for all possible k-contingencies is
O(NkP ).
2. For each post-contingency system state identified above, a check has to be performed to
see if any of the post-contingency transmission flows violate limits. If this check requires
′m′ seconds, the complexity for this step is O(Nkm). Combining steps 1 and 2, the total
complexity for brute-force enumeration is as given by Eq. 3.1 below.
(N − k) Complexity = O(NkP ) +O(Nkm) (3.2)
For real-world power systems, the above complexity could mean evaluating the impact
from millions of combinations, thus making it impractical for online application. Therefore, a
smart contingency analysis algorithm that is able to economically calculate impact and identify
critical (N-2) contingencies is proposed in this chapter for online operation.
3.1.2 Related Work
Existing work can be classified into the following categories - heuristic and non-heuristic
approaches. Reference [12] is an example of a heuristic based approach, where the authors
minimize the number of lines that have to be included in the (N − 2) analysis based on the
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Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF) (Eq. 3.3). The LODF coefficient is used to calculate
the rearrangement of flows in a system when a line is removed [55]. That is, the change in
power flow in line y, f ′y − fy, is obtained from the product of Lxy and pre-tripping flow fx in
line x. In this paper, the authors consider the impact from only those lines that have an LODF
greater than a predefined threshold, therefore reducing the number of combinations.
Lxy =
f ′y − fy
fx
(3.3)
Reference [26] is an example of a non-heuristic approach, where the authors minimize the
number of lines to be considered in an (N − 2) study by exploiting the algebraic structure in
the 2-line outage LODF equation provided in Eq. 3.4.
f ′z − fz =
Lzx(fx + Lxyfy)
1− LyxLxy +
Lzy(Fy + Lyxfx)
1− LyxLxy (3.4)
Existing approaches are based on the principle of minimizing the number of combinations
that have to be evaluated in order to identify impactful contingencies. With reference to Eq. 3.1,
the goal of these approaches is to reduce the number Nk, the number of (N − k) contingencies
that have to be evaluated. They are focussed on system-wide identification of all impactful
contingencies for a limited set of operating conditions. However, during online operation, the
state of the power system changes dynamically and the set of attack vectors identified oﬄine
might not be valid for the changed state. Besides, a smart attacker would construct the attack
vector to cause impact to specific lines in the system. This being the case, system operators
might end up losing precious time in identifying all possible attack combinations in the system.
Therefore, the need is for a method that identifies attack vectors for current system conditions.
Additionally, the method should also be able to quickly provide a list of attack vectors for a
specific line under study.
The proposed proposed approach satisfies both these requirements. Instead of attempting
to reduce the combinations of (N−k) events and then simulating these contingencies to observe
impact on transmission lines, this algorithm attempts to identify all the coordinated contingen-
cies that will result in the overloading of the specific line under study. This approach could be
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used online as the number of (N − k) combinations that have to be evaluated to verify impact
to a particular line is significantly reduced and based on accurate system conditions. The fol-
lowing section proposes a two-step, heuristics-based cyber contingency analysis algorithm that
could be applied online in order to identify impactful coordinated attack vectors.
3.1.3 Mitigation for Spatial Attack Vectors
Figure 3.2 Line 1 Trip - Lines that are most impacted
The change in flow of a transmission line x on the tripping of transmission line y can be
obtained from its Line Outage Distribution Factor (LODF), Lxy. The Zone of Influence (ZOI)
for a transmission line is defined as the set of all the transmission lines that are impacted by
its tripping. The ZOIs are obtained from conventional LODFs for (N − 1) contingencies. The
IEEE 14-bus system could be used as an example to explain this idea. The LODF matrix
for this system is provided in Fig. 3.4. The matrix is 20 × 20 as the system contains twenty
transmission lines. The post-contingency flow for a line i can be calculated by multiplying the
pre-contingency flow of tripped line j with element (i, j) in the LODF matrix.
From Fig. 3.4, it is observed that some elements in every row are in bold. These elements
highlight the line trips that cause the most significant change to the flow in line corresponding
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Figure 3.3 Line 11 Trip - Lines that are most impacted
to the row. This can help define the ZOI. For example, the following are ZOIs for transmission
lines 1, 6 and 19.
• ZOI for line 1: Lines 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Shown in Fig. 3.2)
• ZOI for line 11: Lines 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20 (Shown in Fig. 3.3)
It is observed from the above that the ZOI for lines 1 and 11 include a lot of common lines.
It is also observed that, the tripping of a line most significantly influences its neighboring lines.
The proposed approach in this is built on top of these observations.
The idea is to use the ZOI to identify (N − k) contingency scenarios. From the above
example, we observe that the flow in line 7 is affected by the independent tripping of both lines
1 and 11. This means, if lines 1 and 11 were a part of an (N − 2) attack vector, they would
impact the flow on line 7 with a significant impact. If there was a method to capture the zones
of influence that contain line 7, we would be able to obtain combinations of transmission lines
that, when tripped would impact line 7.
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3.1.4 Heuristics-based Contingency Analysis
The proposed solution is is intended to provide system operators with information on im-
pactful attack vectors, so that appropriate cyber or physical mitigation strategies could be
deployed. The solution is represented by Fig. 3.5.
1. Stage 1: Critical Lines Identification
The heuristics-based algorithm in step 2 essentially identifies all the impactful coordinated
attack vector for a specific line that is requested by the system operator. In step 1, the
system operator should define this critical line based on information from the following
sources.
(a) Oﬄine Risk Analysis - From oﬄine studies such as risk analysis framework presented
in chapter 1, the system operator could be informed of the most critical lines in the
system. He/she could then periodically check if there are potential attack vectors
that an attacker could use to impact critical lines based on current system state.
(b) Online System Conditions - The system operator could identify critical lines from
the information SCADA and cybersecurity systems provide. If measurements pro-
vided by SCADA indicate that a certain critical line is carrying power closer to its
maximum rating, the operator could evaluate impactful coordinated attack vectors
that could cause damage.
2. Stage 2: Attack Vector Identification
The second step involves the application of the heuristics-based algorithm. The algorithm
uses information on critical lines from step 1 to identify (N − k) attack vectors based on
real-time system information obtained form SCADA. The ultimate goal is to identify the
critical substations that have to be compromised in order to create an impactful coordi-
nated attack vector. The system operator could then initiate cyber and/or power system
mitigation. The following section discusses the proposed heuristics-based algorithms in
detail.
53
Figure 3.4 LODF matrix for IEEE 14 bus system [12]
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Figure 3.5 Overview of Heuristics-based Approach
The proposed algorithms make use of the fact that only the nearest neighbors of a tripped
transmission line experience the most significant impact. The following section discusses two
heuristics-based algorithms - i) number of hops and ii) number of hops + LODF.
3.1.5 Heuristic 1: Number of Hops
Algorithm 1 groups all transmission lines ′z′ hops away from the critical transmission line
under examination. Once these lines are identified, (N − k) combinations of transmission
lines are created from this set, to identify impactful contingencies. Impactful contingencies are
identified from the post-contingency flow of the transmission line under examination calculated
using Eq. 3.4.
The algorithm first identifies the primary busses associated with line l, the line under exam-
ination. From these primary busses, the algorithm hops to neighboring busses, accumulating
all the lines associated with these busses. Once a list of all the lines within z hops are identi-
fied, the algorithm, groups k combinations of lines using brute-force enumeration. Using this
algorithm, the brute-force enumeration is performed on a very small number of transmission
lines.
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Algorithm: Hop Heuristic-based Contingency Enumeration
Input: Network model, From bus ′a′ and to-bus ′b′ for line ′l′ under examination, hop
number ′z′, contingency value ′k′
Output: Groups of ’k’ contingency elements
begin
Primary Busses ← a, b
for hop← 1 to z do
[Lines, Secondary Buses] ← FindLines(Primary Buses)
Primary Busses ← Secondary Busses
end
Unique(Lines)
Groups ← Combination(Lines, k)
end
Algorithm 1: Hop-based Heuristic Algorithm
3.1.6 Heuristic 2: Hop + LODF
Algorithm 2 extends the hop-based approach used in heuristic 1 to include LODFs. The
aim is to further reduce the number of combinations that have to evaluated for impact. For
every line ′y′ identified in every hop for line ′l′ under examination, the algorithm identifies if
the the LODF Ll,y is above a pre-defined threshold. Only those lines that satisfy this condition
are included in the pool of lines that will be used to identify (N − k) scenarios.
Algorithm: Hop + LODF Heuristic-based Contingency Enumeration
Input: Network model, From bus ′a′ and to-bus ′b′ for line ′l′ under examination, hop
number ′z′, contingency value ′k′ , LODF Ll,y
Output: Groups of ’k’ contingency elements
begin
Primary Busses ← a, b
for hop← 1 to z do
[Lines, Secondary Buses] ← FindLines(Primary Buses, LODF Ll,y)
Primary Busses ← Secondary Busses
end
Unique(Lines)
Groups ← Combination(Lines, k)
end
Algorithm 2: Hop + LODF based Heuristic Algorithm
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3.1.7 Analysis and Results
The IEEE 118-bus system was used to test the efficiency of the proposed algorithm. The
critical lines were identified using a brute-force simulation approach by evaluating the impact
from all possible (N − 2) attack vectors in the system. For the online phase, the IEEE 118
bus system with a modified system load was used. The heuristics-based algorithm were then
applied to identify impactful (N − 2) vectors. The performance of the algorithms was then
compared to an “ideal system performance” for real-time conditions.
3.1.7.1 Stage 1: Critical Line Identification
The IEEE 118-bus system with standard loading conditions was used for critical line iden-
tification. As the standard IEEE 118-bus model does not have pre-defined line limits, a line
limit of 110MW was assumed for every line. The brute-force approach was applied to evaluate
all N-2 line outages. For every case, the post-contingency line flow for all the transmission
lines was monitored. An (N − 2) case was considered impactful if it forces the power flowing
through a transmission line to exceed 110 MW . Table 3.1 summarizes the statistics for brute
force evaluation. There are a total of 186 transmission lines in the test system and therefore,
a total of 17205 possible (N − 2) combinations. Of these, there are only twenty five impactful
(N − 2) scenarios. The most impacted lines are line 107 with eight (N − 2) scenarios that
impact it. Similarly, lines 102 and 36 have four impactful (N − 2) scenarios each.
Table 3.1 Brute Force Statistics
Number of lines 186
Number of (N − 2) 17205
Number of Impactful Combinations 25
Most Impacted 107 (8), 102 (4), 36 (4)
Table 3.2 identifies all the critical lines identified by the brute force approach. For each
line, the (N − 2) scenarios that impact them are also listed. Using this comprehensive list, the
efficiency of the proposed heuristics-based approach can be determined.
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Table 3.2 Impactful Attack Combinations
Critical Line Impactful Combinations
8 (1+2)
12 (1+2)
30 (32+38)
31 (32+38), (33+38)
32 (31+33)
33 (31+38)
36 (8+32), (8+51), (31+33), (32+38)
38 (31+33)
41 (31+38)
47 (46+49)
51 (46+49)
54 (8+36), (25+29), (32+38)
96 (178+179)
102 (96+97), (96+104), (97+104), (98+99)
104 (1+2), (52+55), (178+179)
107 (1+2), (25+29), (32+38), (35+40), (52+55), (104+119), (116+119), (178+179)
126 (104+107), (116+119)
127 (104+107), (116+119)
138 (139+140), (139+143)
140 (138+139)
143 (138+139)
164 (163+167)
167 (163+164)
169 (163+164)
3.1.7.2 Stage 2: Attack Vector Identification
3.1.7.3 The Score Metric
The heuristics-based approach should be able to identify all attack combinations by eval-
uating the least number of combinations for best performance. In order to rate the efficiency
of the algorithm, we introduce a metric called Score. The expression for score is provided by
following equation provided in Eq. 3.5.
Score = A−1B (3.5)
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Complexity =
Number of Combinations Evaluated
Total Possible Combinations
Efficiency =
Number of Combinations Identified
Total Combinations
For every line under consideration, the score reveals the efficiency of the algorithm in
identifying all the impactful attack scenarios. Parameter A provides the ratio between the
number of scenarios that were evaluated and the total number of possible scenarios. The
total number of possible scenarios is the number of scenarios used for brute-force enumeration.
Parameter B provides the ratio between the number of correct scenarios identified and the total
number of impactful scenarios for that particular line. The maximum achievable score in the
system depends on the line under consideration. However, the least possible score is a 0. This
happens when the algorithm is unable to identify any impactful contingencies. In general, the
higher the score the better the performance of the algorithm.
3.1.7.4 Heuristics-based Approach
The score metric was used to evaluate the performance of the algorithms. In both cases,
the number of hops were limited to a maximum of six, for the reason that the number of
combinations to be evaluated beyond six hops would become significantly large. Table. 3.3
provides a summary of results obtained from applying the hop-based heuristic 1 to the IEEE
118-bus system. The algorithm was applied to only those lines that were identified as critical.
For each line, the table identifies hop-specific - i) the number of (N −2) scenarios evaluated, ii)
the number of impactful scenarios identified, iii) the actual number of impactful scenarios for
that line, and iv) the corresponding score. It was observed that for most lines, the algorithm is
able to successfully identify all possible attack vectors within the first few hops. In two cases,
for lines 104 and 107, the algorithm failed to identify all possible coordinated attack vectors
even after six hops.
59
Table 3.3 Heuristics 1 Results
Line Hops Scenarios Evaluated Scenarios Identified Total Scenarios Score
8
1 15 0 1 0.00
2 120 0 1 0.00
3 465 1 1 37.00
12
1 36 0 1 0.00
2 171 1 1 100.61
30
1 10 0 1 0.00
2 136 0 1 0.00
3 561 1 1 30.67
31
1 10 0 2 0.00
2 105 2 2 163.86
32 1 3 1 1 5735.00
33
1 10 0 1 0.00
2 91 1 1 189.07
36
1 28 0 4 0.00
2 231 3 4 55.86
3 1225 4 4 14.04
38
1 6 0 1 0.00
2 105 1 1 163.86
41
1 21 0 1 0.00
2 153 0 1 0.00
3 435 1 1 39.55
47
1 15 0 1 0.00
2 105 1 1 163.86
51
1 21 0 1 0.00
2 210 1 1 81.93
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Line Hops Scenarios Evaluated Scenarios Identified Total Scenarios Score
54
1 10 0 3 0.00
2 210 2 3 54.62
3 1378 2 3 8.32
4 4465 3 3 3.85
96
1 10 0 1 0.00
2 231 0 1 0.00
3 1711 0 1 0.00
4 5886 1 1 2.92
102 1 21 4 4 819.29
104
1 15 0 3 0.00
2 190 0 3 0.00
3 1830 0 3 0.00
4 5460 1 3 1.05
5 9591 2 3 1.20
6 14706 2 3 0.78
107
1 28 2 8 153.62
2 630 2 8 6.83
3 2211 2 8 1.95
4 5151 3 8 1.25
5 8911 5 8 1.21
6 13695 6 8 0.94
126
1 6 1 2 1433.75
2 171 2 2 100.61
127
1 28 0 2 0.00
2 253 1 2 34.00
3 946 2 2 18.19
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Table 3.3 (Continued)
Line Hops Scenarios Evaluated Scenarios Identified Total Scenarios Score
138
1 15 1 2 573.50
2 105 2 2 163.86
140 1 3 1 1 5735.00
143
1 21 0 1 0.00
2 231 1 1 74.48
164 1 36 1 1 477.92
167 1 36 1 1 477.92
169
1 15 0 1 0.00
2 120 1 1 143.38
Table. 3.4 presents similar results from the application of heuristic 2. In this case, the
algorithm fails to identify all attack vectors for six cases. In addition to lines 104 and 107,
heuristics 2 fails to identify all impactful attack vectors for lines 8, 51, 54, 96, and 104. Fig. 3.6
summarizes the performance of the algorithms for all the lines in the system. From the score
variation study, it was observed that heuristic 2 outperformed heuristic 1 in almost all cases
except for lines 8, 51, 96 and 104. In these cases, the heuristic 2 algorithm was unable to iden-
tify any (N − 2) contingencies. This is because of the LODF threshold defined for heuristic 2.
Similarly, from the study on number of combinations evaluated, heuristic 2 significantly out-
performed heuristic 1 for all transmission line cases. In terms of scenarios correctly identified,
the performance of heuristic 1 and heuristic 2 was compared to the ”ideal scenario” evaluated
by brute-force. It is observed that heuristic 1 is successful in identifying more contingency
cases when compared to heuristic 2 and matches the ideal scenario in most of the cases. In
some cases, as in line 107, heuristic 1 is unable to identify all possible (N − 2) cases owing to
the hop restriction of 6. System operators would be the best judge to identify a suitable score
metric for their system depending on what they feel is more critical - increased computations
or increased accuracy.
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Table 3.4 Heuristics 2 Results
Line Hops Scenarios Evaluated Scenarios Identified Total Scenarios Score
8
1 10 0 1 0.00
2 66 0 1 0.00
3 190 0 1 0.00
4 276 0 1 0.00
5 300 0 1 0.00
6 300 0 1 0.00
12
1 28 0 1 0.00
2 153 1 1 112.45
30
1 10 0 1 0.00
2 66 0 1 0.00
3 120 1 1 143.38
31
1 10 0 2 0.00
2 91 2 2 189.07
32 1 3 1 1 5735.00
33
1 10 0 1 0.00
2 55 1 1 312.82
36
1 28 0 4 0.00
2 210 3 4 61.45
3 595 4 4 28.92
38
1 3 0 1 0.00
2 28 1 1 614.46
41
1 21 0 1 0.00
2 120 0 1 0.00
3 210 1 1 81.93
47
1 1 0 1 0.00
2 3 1 1 5735.00
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Line Hops Scenarios Evaluated Scenarios Identified Total Scenarios Score
51
1 15 0 1 0.00
2 136 0 1 0.00
3 406 0 1 0.00
4 561 0 1 0.00
5 630 0 1 0.00
6 666 0 1 0.00
54
1 10 0 3 0.00
2 66 2 3 173.79
3 153 2 3 74.97
4 231 2 3 49.65
5 276 2 3 41.56
6 351 2 3 32.68
96
1 6 0 1 0.00
2 28 0 1 0.00
3 78 0 1 0.00
4 171 0 1 0.00
5 300 0 1 0.00
6 378 0 1 0.00
102 1 21 4 4 819.29
104
1 10 0 3 0.00
2 66 0 3 0.00
3 136 0 3 0.00
4 210 0 3 0.00
5 276 0 3 0.00
6 300 0 3 0.00
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Line Hops Scenarios Evaluated Scenarios Identified Total Scenarios Score
107
1 21 2 8 204.82
2 253 2 8 17.00
3 435 2 8 9.89
4 528 2 8 8.15
5 595 3 8 10.84
6 630 3 8 10.24
126
1 3 1 2 2867.50
2 66 2 2 260.68
127
1 6 0 2 0.00
2 66 1 2 130.34
3 210 2 2 81.93
138
1 1 1 2 8602.50
2 3 2 2 5735.00
140 1 3 1 1 5735.00
143
1 3 0 1 0.00
2 10 1 1 1720.50
164 1 6 1 1 2867.50
167 1 6 1 1 2867.50
169
1 15 0 1 0.00
2 55 1 1 312.82
3.2 Temporal Attack Vectors
Temporal attack vectors are coordinated attack vectors wherein an attacker controls the
timing of constituent attacks in an attempt to create maximum damage to the system. The
objective of such attacks is to create a more severe impact than if the constituent attacks were
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implemented simultaneously in a traditional (N−2) attack. By controlling the timing variable,
the attacker is in a position to wait for the system to be in its most vulnerable state before
implementing the attack.
Consider an an attack template in which the attacker’s goal is to inflict an (N−2) condition
in the system. After implementing the first attack, where a single transmission line is tripped,
the attacker waits for the system operator to issue a re-dispatch. The re-dispatch will result
in a rearrangement of flows/generation in the system, after which, the attacker strategically
selects the second attack vector to cause transmission line overloads. An attacker may adopt
this approach while attempting to compromise robust systems that are resilient to (N − 2)
cases in its normal state. By forcing the operators to change the state of the system using the
first attack, the attacker is able to create an impact through the second impact. In the next
section, this hypothesis is verified through a temporal attack study on the New-England 39-bus
system (Fig. 3.13).
3.2.1 Impact from Temporal Attacks
This study considers the aforementioned attack template, wherein two transmission lines
are tripped. Two cases are studied. In the first case, both transmission lines are tripped
simultaneously in an (N − 2) attack. In the second case, the attacker waits for operator action
before he implements the second attack. This case will be referred to as a temporal attack.
The impact is observed in terms transmission line overload.
3.2.1.1 Case 1 - (N − 2) attack
Fig. 3.7 shows the timeline of events for an (N − 2) attack. Normal system state at time T0
refers to the normal operating point identified by system operators through the optimal power
flow process. Under these conditions, the generators are operating at or below their limits as
shown by Fig. 3.8. In this, the blue bars represent generator capacities for all generators in the
system as labelled in the x-axis. The normal operating point for generators is represented by
the grey bars and it is observed that the operating point for all generators is within the limit
indicated by the blue bars. The transmission line limits and flows are represented in Fig. 3.9.
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It is observed that the normal flows represented by the grey bars are within the line limits
represented by the green bars.
Figure 3.7 (N − 2) Attack - Sequence of events
At T1, the attacker implements the (N−2) attack in a bid to cause impact. To demonstrate
the impact of the timing variable, an (N − 2) attack vector that does not cause an impact,
that is transmission limit violation, is considered; in this case, lines 30 and 31 are tripped. The
transmission line flows post (N − 2) attack are indicated in Fig. 3.9 by the red bars. The flows
on lines 30 and 31 become zero and it is observed that none of the other transmission limits
are violated.
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3.2.1.2 Case 2 - Temporal attack
The timeline of events for a temporal attack is presented in Fig. 3.10. In this case, the
attacker trips only one line, line 30, at T1. At this point, the attacker waits for the system
operator to perform a control action. In this case, the operator performs by a redispatch for the
changed topology at T2 by running an optimal power flow. The modified generator set points
are represented in Fig. 3.11 by the red bars. It is observed that the new operating points are
within generator limits.
At T3, the attacker implements the second attack by tripping line 31. The impact of this
attack is observed in Fig. 3.12. It is observed that for lines 4 and 40 (indicated by the black
arrows), the post-attack flow exceeds represented by the red bars exceed line limits represented
by the green bars. This scenario could in turn cause the overloaded transmission lines to trip
causing further impacts to system stability.
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Figure 3.10 Timing Attack - Sequence of events
Table 3.5 summarizes the comparison between an (N −2) and timing attack for this partic-
ular attack vector. It is observed that all parameters are within limits for the (N−2) attack, in
contrast to the timing attack which results in two violations. From these cases, it is observed
that the timing variable is a critical parameter in determining the impact of an attack. An
attack on the same pair of transmission lines can produce different impacts when timing comes
into the picture. Fig. 3.13 highlights the changes to the system during the timing attack. The
red crosses identify the transmission lines that are targeted by the attacker. The red arrows
represent the change to generator operating points after the first attack. The blue stars identify
lines that are impacted by the timing attack. It is observed from Fig. 3.13 and table 3.5 that
the redispatch forces the generator at bus 37 to ramp down from 568.87MW to 335MW and
generator at bus 39 to ramp up from 796.2 MW to 1018 MW . Intuitively, this means the
generator at bus 39 has greater responsibility in supplying the load at bus 25, thus increasing
the flow on line 4 (bus 2-25) after the redispatch. When the second attack is implemented,
the rearrangement of flows resulted in a flow of 512.13MW in the line, beyond its capacity of
500MW . In the case of the (N −2) attack, the absence of a redispatch meant the generator at
bus 37 continued to supply to the load at bus 25, thereby eliminating the possibility of overload
on line 4.
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Figure 3.11 System Generation Before and After Timing Attack
Table 3.5 (N − 2) Attack vs. Temporal Attack
Component Limit (MW) Post (N − 2) Value (MW) Post Timing Value (MW)
Line 4 (bus 2-25) 500 325.75 512.13
Line 40 (bus 15-16) 600 565.43 623.13
Gen at 33 652 604.27 652
Gen at 37 564 568.87 335
Gen at 38 865 344.07 286.37
Gen at 39 1100 796.2 1018.03
3.3 Future Research
1. Transient Stability Analyses: The impact metric used in this analyses, that is transmission
line overload, is a static stability metric. In order to do a complete assessment of impacts
from spatial and temporal attacks, it is important to consider impacts on transient system
stability as well.
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Figure 3.13 New England 39-bus system - Flows after temporal attack
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2. Algorithms: The test cases used in this study were obtained through brute-force enu-
meration. The computation time was not significant due to the size of the system. In
real-world systems, the computation time could be significantly large to employ a brute-
force type approach to enumerate all possible spatial and temporal attack vectors. Thus,
a systematic approach through which attack vectors are identified in reasonable time is
required.
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CHAPTER 4. ATTACK-RESILIENT CONTROL FOR SMART GRID
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 1, ICS software do not apply strong input validation methods.
In most cases, the softwares tend to accept any SCADA input without proper checks. This
makes these applications vulnerable to data integrity attacks. In a data integrity attack, a
smart attacker could injects malicious measurements targeting a specific variable. If control
applications accept measurements without any input validation techniques, the resulting control
command could be detrimental to system stability. The need is to make control applications
smarter by equipping them with attack detection and mitigation techniques. In this chapter,
we first demonstrate the impact of data integrity attacks on Automatic Generation Control
(AGC) to power system frequency and electricity market operation. We propose a general
framework to the application of attack resilient control to power systems as a composition of
smart attack detection and mitigation. Finally, we develop a model-based anomaly detection
and attack mitigation algorithm for AGC. We evaluate the detection capability of the proposed
anomaly detection algorithm through simulation studies. Our results show that the algorithm
is capable of detecting scaling and ramp attacks with low false positive and negative rates. The
proposed model-based mitigation algorithm is also efficient in maintaining system frequency
within acceptable limits during the attack period.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized by the following.
Problem Statement - Develop a methodology to detect and mitigate impact of data integrity
attacks on power system control applications.
Proposed Solution - The chapter specifically deals with the automatic generation control
application. Attack resilient control, which is a combination of domain-specific anomaly detec-
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tion and model-based AGC, is proposed as a solution to defend automatic generation control
against. It shown that physical system information, short-term load forecasts in this case, can
be used to develop domain-specific anomaly detection algorithms. Similarly, model-based AGC,
also designed using short-term load forecasts, is developed to function in the absence of au-
thentic field measurements. Results from attack-defense studies on test systems show that the
anomaly detection algorithm is efficient in detecting malicious data injections and model-based
AGC is able to maintain system stability in the absence of field measurements.
4.2 Related Work
The following research efforts have looked into the impacts of cyber attacks on power system
control applications. In our earlier work [46], the impact of data integrity attacks directed at
the AGC on operating frequency stability was introduced. In [31], Esfahani et al. propose a
technique to gauge the impact of an intrusion attack on a 2-Area power system. The impact
of cyber attacks on FACTS are discussed in [40] and [47]. In [58], the impact of cyber attacks
directed at wind farms on power system dynamics was presented. In [24], the authors present
the impacts of data integrity and denial of service attacks on a chemical reactor system. The
authors of [49] and [48] discuss the impact of a cyber attack on a power system in terms of load
loss. In [28], the authors show the impact of a cyber attack on the total generation in a system
through a graph-based model. The impact of data injection and manipulation on power system
state estimation is presented in [29]. In [59], the impact of load redistribution attacks on state
estimation is presented. The authors show that operational decisions made based on incorrect
power flow and load measurements can cause uneconomic operation and stressed operating
states. In [16], the authors explore the impact of compromised measurements on electricity
markets. The attack-defense experiment is modeled using game theory.
The authors of [9] have consolidated a classification of anomaly detection techniques and
grouped these research efforts appropriately. The authors of [14] apply the statistical anomaly
detection technique to identify progressive faults in gearbox operation. In [15], the authors
present a real-time payload-based anomaly detection for critical infrastructures. In [10], the
authors use the rough set classification algorithm to develop an anomaly detection technique
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to identify errors introduced in the power flow meters. To the best of our knowledge, none of
these efforts inspect the information conveyed by these packet at the application level. These
detection techniques do not check if the reported measurements conform to power system
theory. One such effort employs invariant induction, a technique that identifies power flow
measurements that do not satisfy an underlying algebraic equation as anomalies [7]. However,
no such technique exists for real-time control applications. The rest of this chapter discusses
the impact of malicious data injection on AGC, and the design and implementation of attack
detection and mitigation.
4.3 Control System Attack Model and Impact Studies
In automated control systems (Fig. 4.1), the control center accepts measurements y(t) as
input from field devices and processes them to obtain the output control signal u(t). A smart
attacker could manipulate measurements such that any operational decision made based on
these measurements could trigger control actions that are unwarranted for the true system
state. This could in turn cause instabilities in the underlying physical system or force the
system to operate at uneconomical operating conditions due to non-optimal control actions.
The need is for attack resilient control systems that are able to detect the presence of malicious
data.
Figure 4.1 Control System Model.
4.3.1 Attack Templates
This section presents a formal model for the attack templates explored in this chapter
[24]. The impact of these attacks on power system stability and electricity market operation is
presented. In the following definitions, t and τa represent time and attack period, respectively.
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i) Scaling Attack
A scaling attack involves modifying true measurements to higher or lower values depending
on the scaling attack parameter λs.
y∗(t) =
 y(t) for t /∈ τa(1 + λs) ∗ y(t) for t ∈ τa
iii)Ramp Attack
Ramp attacks involve gradual modification of true measurements by the addition of λr . t,
a ramp function that gradually increases/decreases with time.
y∗(t) =
 y(t) for t /∈ τay(t) + λr . t for t ∈ τa
ii) Pulse Attack
As opposed to a scaling attack, where measurements are modified to higher/lower values
during the entire duration of the attack, this type of attack involves modifying measurements
through temporally-spaced short pulses with attack parameter λp.
iv) Random Attack
This attack involves the addition of positive values returned by a uniform random function
to the true measurements. The upper (a) and lower (b) bounds for selection are provided to
the function as an input.
y∗(t) =
 y(t) for t /∈ τay(t) + rand(a, b) for t ∈ τa
4.3.2 Impact of Data Integrity Attacks on AGC
The power system is divided into balancing areas that are connected by tie lines to facilitate
exchange of power. Each balancing area has a control center in which the AGC application runs
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Figure 4.2 3-Area System.
as a part of the energy management system. The AGC is responsible for maintaining system
frequency at 60 Hz and limiting tie line power exchanges to their scheduled values. To this
end, the algorithm calculates generator corrections based on frequency and tie line power flow
measurements obtained from remote sensors via Inter-Control Center Communication Protocol
(ICCP). These generator corrections, called the Area Control Error (ACE), are issued once
every 5 seconds. The ACE for balancing area ′i′, calculated based on the following equation,
instructs generators to either ramp up or down.
ACEi = (Ptie − Psch) + βi(f − 60) (4.1)
In the above equation, Psch is the scheduled tie-line power exchange between the balancing
areas, βi is the frequency bias for balancing area i and 60 (Hz) corresponds to the desired
system frequency. The variables Ptie and f are the tie line power flow and system frequency
measurements obtained from sensors in the system. The attack templates discussed in this
chapter involve injection of fabricated Ptie and f measurements in order to force the miscal-
culation of ACE. As the AGC is required to issue control commands once every 5 seconds, it
is unable to benefit from existing measurement validation techniques such as the state estima-
tion, which typically runs once every 5 minutes at the ISO/RTO level. This makes the AGC
vulnerable to attacks that involve measurement corruption.
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The impacts of attacks on the AGC will be demonstrated using the 3-area system shown in
Fig. 4.2. The system consists of three balancing areas that are interconnected by tie lines. The
attack templates require the compromise of sensors L1, L2 and f , the tie line power flow and
frequency sensors that provide measurements to AGC. The attacker possesses knowledge to
compromise these sensors at the corresponding substations bypassing existing security mecha-
nisms.
In order to inject the correct measurements according to the attack template, the attacker is
required to know AGC operation as well as information on the target system. This information
includes load forecasts, scheduled tie line flows, load frequency sensitivity parameter ‘D’, droop
constant ‘R’ and frequency bias β for each area. The load forecast and scheduled tie line
flow information are used to modify system load perception according to the attack template.
Parameters D and R are used by the attacker in Eq. 4.2 to identify impactful attack parameters
in the attack parameter selection process and to calculate attack frequency measurements as
shown later. It is assumed that the maximum value of ACE that does not raise an alarm
in the EMS is 0.05 pu. The attacker uses the frequency bias β in Eq. 4.1 to ensure that the
ACE computed based on injected measurements remains within this value and that the attack
remains undetected. These parameters for the 3-area system are provided in Table 4.1. The
following sections discuss the attack mechanism the corresponding physical system and market
impacts.
Table 4.1 3-Area System Simulation Parameters (from [6])
Area ′i′ D (pu/Hz) R (Hz/pu) β (pu/Hz)
Area 1 0.015 3.00 0.3483
Area 2 0.016 2.73 0.3827
Area 3 0.015 2.82 0.3692
1) Impact on Physical System Stability
The threat actors for this type of attack could be disgruntled employees, insiders, nation
states or terrorist organizations keen on affecting the reliability of the system. The goal of the
attack is to cause a rapid decline in the system frequency in order to trigger load shedding
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schemes. Pulse and random attacks do not fit this purpose as the attacker would look to inflict
a significant and definite impact.
In this scenario, the attacker modifies generator operating points through the AGC by
providing a wrong perception of the system load. The attack mechanism can be explained with
the following example. The power flows shown in Fig. 4.2 represent the scheduled tie line flow
values. The attacker tricks Area 1 AGC into believing that the flow on L2 has increased by
0.01 pu, which corresponds to an increase in system load ∆PL. This is achieved by reporting
a tie line power flow measurement of 0.1122 pu to the AGC. At the same time, the attacker
plays normal measurements according to scheduled value to Area 3 AGC in order to prevent
corrective action. The attacker then calculates the malicious frequency measurement to be
reported to the AGC using the equation,
∆F =
−∆PL
3∑
i=1
( 1Ri +Di)
= −0.0091 (4.2)
On receiving the measurements, Area 1 AGC computes the ACE to a value of 0.0068 pu,
and will instruct generators in Area 1 to ramp down. However, in reality, this action causes
the system generation to reduce below the actual system load, thereby causing a generation
imbalance. This generation imbalance would reduce system frequency. The following section
introduces the attacker’s procedure to identify a value for attack parameters λs and λr.
i) Attack Parameter Selection
The selection of λs and λr is critical from the attacker’s perspective. The parameters have
to be selected such that the attack creates the desired impact and at the same time does not
trigger any data quality alarms in the control center. To be more precise, the attacker has to
satisfy the following criteria.
1. It is assumed that data quality alarms would be triggered if the calculated ACE exceeds
0.05 pu. The ACE calculated by the control center during the attack should not exceed
this value.
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2. Underfrequency load shedding schemes are triggered only when the system frequency
reaches 59.3 Hz [5]. Hence, the attack parameters should be selected such that the
system frequency declines to 59.3Hz to cause an impact.
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Figure 4.3 Scaling Attack Parameter Selection
Intuitively, these criteria have contrasting requirements. Fig. 4.3 plots the variation of
maximum ACE and the least system frequency during the attack period (10 AM − 1 PM)
against a range of λs. The attacker would construct these graphs based on Eq. 4.1 and 4.2 for
attack parameter selection. The following observations can be made from these figures.
1. As the magnitude of λs increases, the least system frequency observed during the attack
decreases. At a value of λs = 0.023, the system frequency declines to 59.3 Hz. This
means, for this system under consideration, in order for the scaling attack to have an
impact, the value of λs should be a minimum of 0.023. Thus, this analysis identifies the
lower bound λs,min for the attack magnitude.
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2. As the value of λs increases, the maximum ACE generated during the attack period
increases. After a value of λs = 0.049, the maximum ACE increases beyond the threshold
of 0.05 pu. This means, beyond a value of λs = 0.049, the data quality alarms in the
control center would be triggered. Hence, for this system, in order for the attack to be
stealthy, the maximum attack parameter λs,max should be below 0.049.
To summarize, in order for the scaling attack to be effective during this period, that is
impactful and stealthy, the condition (0.023 < λs < 0.049) has to be satisfied. A similar
analysis for ramp attacks reveals that in order for the attack to be effective, the condition
(0.0022 < λr < 0.0024) has to be satisfied. In order to cause maximum impact, the attacker
would use λs = 0.049 for scaling attacks and λr = 0.0024 for ramp attacks. Fig. 4.4 shows
the variation between the actual system load and the perceived load during scaling and ramp
attacks with these parameters. Fig. 4.5 shows the frequency of the system in response to the
change in generation.
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ii) Impact Analysis
The following observations can be made from Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 about the impact on physical
system stability.
1. Firstly, the maximum ACE deviation during the scaling and ramp attacks is 0.0481pu and
0.0476 pu, respectively. As these values remain within the 0.05 pu threshold, data quality
alarms are not triggered in the control center (This is not shown in Fig. 4.4 and 4.5).
2. Secondly, it is observed the system frequency due to both scaling and ramp attacks
declines to 59.3Hz, thus leading to a load shedding scenario.
3. The system frequency due to scaling attack declines to 59.3Hz much sooner when com-
pared to ramp attacks. This is because the scaling attack instantly modifies the perceived
load thereby triggering significant ACE correction. The ramp attack injects gradual de-
viations in perceived load and thereby creates a delayed impact.
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4. Finally, it is observed that the magnitude of frequency decline caused by scaling attack is
more severe when compared to the ramp attack despite similar perceived loads towards
the end of the attack period. This is because the scaling attack effects a significant
difference between system load and generation for a longer duration when compared to
the ramp attack.
From the above, it can be inferred that the impact from scaling attack is more severe when
compared to ramp attack. For this period of operation, maximum impact will be caused if
parameters λs = 0.049 for scaling and λr = 0.0024 for ramp were employed. An attacker would
have to perform similar analysis in order identify effective λs and λr ranges for other periods
of operation.
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Figure 4.6 Frequency during Electricity Market Attack.
2) Impacts on Electricity Market Operation
The attack on electricity market operation involves modification of generator operating
points identified by the security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). A market participant
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Figure 4.7 Excess Generation during Electricity Market Attack.
(utility) could use this type of attack to increase its generation and reduce generation in an
adjacent balancing area. By doing so, the utility is able to increase revenue as it receives a
greater financial settlement.
Using the same base case in Fig. 4.2, the attack mechanism can be explained as follows.
The tie line flow between Area 2 and 1 is 0.0205 pu. In this case, the attacker modifies this
measurement value to 0.0225 pu to indicate that Area 2 is supplying more than the scheduled
value. The AGC in Area 2 calculates the ACE corresponding to this measurement as 0.0013pu,
which forces the generators in the area to ramp down. At the same time, the ACE computed by
the AGC in Area 1 forces the generators in Area 1 to ramp up, thereby generating more than
operating point suggested by the SCED. As a decrease in generation in Area 2 is compensated
by an increase in Area 1, the system frequency is not impacted. This is confirmed in Fig. 4.6,
where the system frequency is found to remain around 60Hz even during attacks. However, the
market participant in Area 1 will benefit from this scenario as it receives a greater settlement.
In the following section, the impact of scaling, pulse and random attacks on calculation of
settlements is shown.
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The following parameters were used for the attacks - i) Scaling - λs = 0.001, ii) Pulse -
λp = 0.0025, and iii) Random - a = 0.03, b = 0. Fig. 4.7 shows the additional generation from
Area 1 as a result of the attack.
• The scaling attack forces the units in Area 1 to operate at 0.0011pu higher than the correct
operating point for a scaling factor λs = 0.001. As a result, the generator produces a
total excess generation of 0.0266 pu during the attack period.
• The pulse attack causes Area 1 to have periods of excess generation of 0.0033 pu. This
results in a total excess generation of 0.0395 pu during the attack period.
• The random attack results in a total excess generation of 0.0430 pu during the attack
period.
This attack impacts the calculation of settlements to market participants. The settlement
provided to a generation utility is a product of the power supplied by the utility to the system
and the locational marginal price (LMP). The following generator parameters were assumed
for LMP calculation.
Table 4.2 Generator Parameter for LMP Calculation
Area Cost Per-unit Limit (min, max)
Area 1 33.07 $/MWhr 0.3, 0.8
Area 2 32.11 $/MWhr 0.2, 0.3
Area 3 32.54 $/MWhr 0.1, 0.4
For the load forecast during the period of simulation, the LMP was obtained to be 32.54
$/MWhr at all nodes. Assuming a system base of 1000MW , the total excess generation during
the attack period for scaling, pulse and random attacks is 26.6 MW , 39.5 MW and 43 MW .
This corresponds to additional settlements of 865.56 $, 1285.33 $ and 1399.22 $, respectively.
Hence, for the attack scenarios presented in this section, the impact of random attack on market
operation is the highest, followed by pulse and scaling attacks. An attacker could use these
attacks periodically to consistently increase settlement.
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4.4 Attack Resilient Control for Power Systems
The notion of attack resilient control for ICS was first presented in [53]. With reference to
the cyber-attacks context, we define attack resilient control as a combination of smart attack
detection and mitigation. Smart attack detection, for example, could be implemented through
domain-specific anomaly detection algorithms that verify the integrity of received measurements
based on simulated measurements obtained from equations that govern the functioning of the
underlying physical system. Smart mitigation techniques should have the ability to function
using forecasts when measurements can not be trusted.
The power system is composed of several control systems that work in conjunction to ensure
system stability [50]. Each control application has its own vulnerabilities depending on the type
of protocol, network architecture and security technologies it uses. Similarly, the impact from
a successful attack on a control system depends on the physical parameter it is monitoring
and controlling [45]. Therefore, there may not be one single solution for an attack resilient
power system. It is important for critical power system control applications to be provided
with the required intelligence to detect attacks impactful in that domain. The following classes
of information could be used to design attack resilient control modules.
• Forecasts: Load forecasts could be used to detect attacks that mimic unprecedented load
changes. In [58], a scenario in which the attacker modifies Pref (reference power) in a
wind turbine to force a reduction in the active power output was shown. In this scenario,
wind forecast information could have been used to detect the attack.
• Situational Awareness: Stability limits, system topology, etc. could help identify at-
tack scenarios. Situational awareness could also help process mitigation strategies. E.g.
Hospitals zones are given priority in scenarios where load shedding has to be performed.
• System Resources: System resources like generation reserves, VAR reserves, available
transmission capacity, backup communication paths, etc. should be considered to process
efficient mitigation strategies. E.g., if the the cyber logs of a substation reveal a potential
attack, generation could be re-dispatched to prevent instabilities if the attack is successful.
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• Attack Templates: The control module should be aware of effective attack templates and
attack signatures for each control application. This could assist in early attack detection
and defense at the cyber layer.
• System Data: System parameter data, such as inertia constants H, play a critical role in
system response to disturbances. A control module provided with this information would
be able to check for anomalous behavior in system performance.
Attack Resilient Control for AGC
The objective of the proposed attack resilient control mechanism for AGC is twofold - i)
to detect the presence of malicious measurements and prevent the controller from performing
incorrect ACE computations, and ii) to maintain the balance between generation and demand
in the presence of untrusted measurements by using a model-based approach. In this chapter,
we propose a mitigation strategy for attacks that impact physical stability of the power system
only. Fig. 4.8 presents a conceptual diagram for the implementation of attack-resilient AGC.
The frequency and tie-line flow measurements received at the control center will be used by the
AGC to calculate ACER, the real-time ACE. This ACER is checked by the anomaly detection
engine to determine if the value is a anomalous. If ACER is identified as an anomaly, the
model-based AGC is called upon.
Figure 4.8 Attack Resilient Control for AGC.
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4.4.1 Anomaly Detection Engine
Real-time load forecasts are calculated in 5-minute intervals for 60-180 minutes in the
future [51]. The anomaly detection algorithm uses this real-time load forecast to predict AGC
operation over a given time-period. During real-time operation, the performance of AGC is
compared to this prediction to identify anomalies. The anomaly detection algorithm consists
of two rules to detect anomalies. Rule 1 employs statistical characterization of forecasted ACE
values and rule 2 uses temporal characterization of ACE performance. Rules 1 and 2 work in
conjunction with one another to detect smart attacks that can cause frequency instabilities of
the type described earlier. Details on rules 1 and 2 are provided below.
4.4.1.1 Rule 1 - Statistical Characterization of ACE
This rule is incorporated to catch single exorbitant ACE values obtained from malicious
measurements. The following steps explain this process in detail.
• Step 1: Density Estimation
Before every hour of operation, the anomaly detection engine receives the load forecast
for the next hour. Based on this information and the generation schedule, an “ACE
forecast” for the next hour of operation is made. The forecasted ACE (ACEF ) values are
then fed into a Kernel Density Estimator module [42]. The density estimator constructs
a probability density, f(ACEF ), for the inputed ACEF values as shown in Fig. 4.9. The
probability of a particular range of ACEF values is obtained by integrating f(ACEF )
between the range. The probability density helps identify the range of ACE values that
are most probable during the next hour of operation.
• Step 2: Anomaly Detection
A bound δ1 that corresponds to the probability of a range of ACE values, that is the area
under the density graph, is specified to classify anomalies from true values. This δ1 is
one of the tuning parameters of the anomaly detection engine. If δ1 = 90%, the anomaly
detection algorithm identifies the range of ACEF values, [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ], that has
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Figure 4.9 PDF of Forecasted ACE Values (δ1 = 90%).
a probability of 0.9. The range [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] is calculated from the following
equation.
δ1 =
∫ ACEFmax
ACEFmin
f(ACEF )
The following algorithm ensures the area indicated by δ1 is determined over the most
probable values of ACEF .
Algorithm: [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] Identifier
Input: f(ACEF ), δ1
Output: [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ]
begin
i = j = index (max f (ACEF ))
Area = A(i, j)
while Area < δ1 do
if A(i-1, j) > A(i, j+1) then
i = i-1
else
j = j+1
end
Area = A(i,j)
end
end
Once the probability density is constructed, the algorithm identifies the index of the
ACEF which has the highest value for f (ACEF ) and assigns the value to variables i
and j. Next, the area under the graph, which gives the probability, is determined using
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the function A (i, j). The while loop is executed as long as A (i, j) < δ1. The algorithm
compares A (i−1, j) and A (i, j−1). If A (i−1, j) > A (i, j−1), the value of i is changed
to i − 1. If A (i, j − 1) > A (i − 1, j), j is incremented by 1. This ensures that area is
identified across the most probable ACEF values. Once A (i, j) < δ1 is false, the values
of ACEF at i and j are identified as ACEFmin and ACEFmax , respectively.
During operation, if ACER computed by the AGC algorithm falls outside [ACEFmin ,
ACEFmax ], the measurement is identified as an anomaly.
4.4.1.2 Rule 2 - Temporal Characterization of ACE
In some cases such as ramp attacks, smart attackers may manipulate measurements such
that the system is gradually deviated from the correct state of operation to conceal the attack
effectively. In such scenarios, rule 1 alone is insufficient as successive ACER values could fall
within [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] range obtained from δ1. Under such circumstances, it becomes
important to observe a series of measurements to identify an attack. Rule 2 of the anomaly de-
tection algorithm observes a series of ACER measurements to detect ramp attack type scenarios
that gradually modify operating points of generators.
The ACE is a corrective signal sent to generating units to adjust operating points once every
five seconds. During a period of operation the final operating points of generating units are a
result of successive ACE corrections added to the initial operating point. The ACE corrections
are generated as a result of load changes. Hence, an algebraic sum of ACE signals will reflect
the load change during that period of operation.
• Anomaly Detection
A comparison of the algebraic sum of ACER and ACEF values will reveal the difference
between the expected final operating point and actual final operating point during a
time-period of operation, t. Ψ is defined as,
Ψ = |ΣtACEF − ΣtACER|
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A δ2 bound is defined such that, if Ψ > δ2, the real-time ACE during the time period,
that is ACER ∈ t are marked as anomalies.
During real-time operation, the time taken to check if ACER and ΣACER satisfy rules 1
and 2, respectively, should be less than a second in modern computers. Therefore, the proposed
anomaly detection algorithm will operate within the AGC cycle.
4.4.1.3 Anomaly Detection Engine Parameter Selection
The performance of the anomaly detection engine is tied to parameters δ1 and δ2. System
operators or software programs should use the following guideline to tune δ1 and δ2 for low
False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates.
• Step 1: The following data should be generated from the real-time load forecast - i)
f (ACEF ) and ΣtACEF data and ii) effective λs,min < λs < λs,max and λr,min < λr < λr,max
ranges for the period of operation under consideration.
• Step 2: Create a dataset that consists of true values and measurements corrupted with
λs,min and λr,min that were identified in the previous step. This is to ensure that any
attack with λ > λmin is detected. This dataset will be used in the next step to tune δ1
and δ2 for low FP and FN rates.
• Step 3: Run the AGC algorithm oﬄine with the dataset created in the previous step
in order to identify ACE and ΣtACE. Some of these values are a result of true mea-
surements and some of them are derived from corrupt measurements. For every value
of δ1, identify [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] from f (ACEF ) and observe if ACE is identified
as anomaly or true according to rule 1 check. Similarly, for every value of δ2 calculate
Ψ from ΣtACE and ΣtACEF and observe if ΣtACE is identified as anomaly or true
according to rule 2 check. Depending on the nature of the original data and result of the
anomaly check, calculate the False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates for every
value of δ1 and δ2. Select δ1 and δ2 values corresponding to low FP and FN rates.
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The FP and FN rates are calculated from Eq. 4.3 and 4.4, where TN and TP refer to true
negatives and true positives, respectively. An efficient anomaly detection algorithm should have
low FP and FN rates. If the FP rate is too high, there will be too many false alarms and the
operators will lose their trust in the system. A high FN rate means that the anomaly detection
algorithm will fail to catch malicious measurements and attacks will not be detected. Therefore,
it becomes important to determine the optimal amount of δ1 and δ2 to avoid situations of this
type.
FP Rate =
FP Count
FP Count+ TN Count
(4.3)
FN Rate =
FN Count
FN Count+ TP Count
(4.4)
4.4.2 Model-based Attack Mitigation
In scenarios where the meters or communication channels to the control center are compro-
mised, the anomaly detection algorithm will be effective in identifying bad data. Under such
circumstances, measurements from field sensors can no longer be trusted. The control center
will be “flying blind” while trying to match the load and generation. The need is to make use
of a technique that makes an educated guess based on system knowledge and appropriately
issues ACE commands to generators without pressing need for measurements.
Real-time load forecasts are calculated using techniques such as regression models, neural
networks and statistical learning algorithms. These approaches take into account variables
that include weather forecasts and time factors (time of the day, year, etc.) to arrive at a load
forecast.
Figure 4.10 Generation of ACEF .
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The proposed model-based mitigation strategy uses this load forecast in order to predict
AGC performance and thereby obtain the ACE forecast (ACEF ). As shown in Fig. 4.10, an
error is added to the forecast in order to generate a simulated real-time load. The simulated
real-time load and the forecast are then fed into an oﬄine AGC module. As system generation
resources are planned based on the load forecast, running the AGC algorithm oﬄine using this
forecast and simulated real-time load as input would generate ACEF .
As explained earlier, the ACEF obtained from this block is fed into the Kernel Density
Estimator module for the purposes of attack detection. For mitigation, the mean of the ACEF
for the forecast period is used to issue generator correction during an attack. As the real-time
load forecast is made for every 5 minutes for the next one hour of operation, the mitigation
will pre-compute 12 ACEF corrections for the time period. When an anomaly is detected, the
mean of these forecasted ACE values would be issued as generator corrections. This approach
is followed until the trust in sensors or communication channels is restored.
4.5 Simulation Studies
The goal of this section is to analyze the performance of the anomaly detection and model-
based mitigation during attack scenarios. The study involves two components - i) Anomaly
detection engine tuning for the period of operation under consideration and ii) Performance
analysis of attack resilient control during attack scenarios. The attack-defense experiments on
AGC was performed using the 3-Area power system introduced in section 4.3. Additionally,
the following data are required to perform these studies.
• Real-time load forecasts - Real-time load forecasts are used to schedule generation re-
sources during real-time operation [51]. The New England ISO website provides 5-minute
load data for their system. As corresponding load forecast information is unavailable, the
actual load data was per-unitized and assumed to be the real-time load forecast for the
3-Area power system. The real-time load forecast is used to calculate f(ACEF ) and
Σt(ACEF ) for anomaly detection tuning and mean of ACEF for model-based mitigation.
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• Load data - The load data for the same time period as above is obtained by adding
an error to the real-time forecast. Reference [3] characterizes the error from real-time
load forecast into a truncated normal distribution with mean - 1.15, min/max -/+349,
standard deviation 98 and autocorrelation 0.61. Load data generated using this technique
is made use of in the following cases - i) to generate dataset for anomaly detection engine
tuning and ii) to generate corrupted load data for performance analysis of attack resilient
control.
Table 4.3 Simulation Case Study Summary
Attack Time λ δ1, δ2
Scaling 10AM − 1 PM 0.024 < λs < 0.05 0.92, 0.049
Ramp 1 PM − 4 PM 0.0021 < λr < 0.0024 0.94, 0.05
The performance of attack resilient control was analyzed using data for one day of operation
obtained from [4]. The scaling and ramp attacks were implemented between 10 AM − 1 PM
and 1 PM − 4 PM , respectively. Table. 4.3 summarizes the effective λr and λs range for this
period of operation along with δ1 and δ2 used by the anomaly detection engine for the first
hour. The following section explains anomaly detection engine tuning for the scaling attack
time period.
4.5.1 Anomaly Detection Engine Tuning
The parameters δ1 and δ2 have to be selected for every hour of operation in order to maintain
acceptable FP and FN rates. Based on the guideline presented in section 4.4.1.3, this process
is demonstrated for the period from 10AM − 11AM from the test data.
1. Step 1: From the load forecasts for this period, f (ACEF ) and ΣtACEF were generated.
Through the λ selection procedure shown in Sec. 4.3.2, the λs and λr ranges for this period
were identified as - i) 0.024 < λs < 0.05 and ii) 0.0021 < λr < 0.0024.
2. Step 2: A dataset was created with a hundred load data subsets by adding noise to the
real-time load forecast. Each load data subset is a representation of the load curve for the
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period under consideration. Of these, twenty subsets were corrupted with scaling attack
template with λs,min = 0.024 and another twenty subsets were corrupted using the ramp
attack template with λr,min = 0.021.
3. Step 3: The objective of this step is to identify values of δ1 and δ2 that result in low
FP and FN rates. For this purpose, the FP and FN rates for the ranges 0.8 < δ1 < 0.99
and 0.01 < δ2 < 0.08 were analyzed. Each subset of load data was run through an oﬄine
AGC program in order to determine the individual ACE values and ΣtACE. Based on
rules 1 and 2, anomalies were identified in the attack data set for every value of δ1 and
δ2. The FP and FN rates were then calculated based on the results of anomaly detection.
In these studies, the impact of δ1 on FP and FN rates was evaluated with rule 1 only
implemented. Similarly, studies for impact of δ2 on FP and FN rates was performed with
only rule 2 implemented. The following section discusses these results.
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Figure 4.11 False Positives Analysis
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Figure 4.12 False Negatives Analysis
• False Positive Analysis: Fig. 4.11 presents the variation of false negative rate for
different values of δ1 and δ2. As the value of δ1 increases from 0.8 to 0.99, the false
positive rate decreases. This is because, at lower values of δ1, even true ACE values are
also identified as anomalies as they lie outside the [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] range. The FP
rate beyond δ1 = 0.92 is minimum at zero. As in the case of δ1, the FP rate decreases
with as δ2 is varied between 0.01 and 0.08. The FP rate is significantly high in the region
δ2 < 0.03. As the δ2 bound is strict at this point, the condition Ψ > δ2 is satisfied even
for true measurements. The FP rate is zero in the region δ2 > 0.049.
• False Negative Analysis: Fig. 4.12 presents the variation of false negative rate for
different values of δ1 and δ2. At a value of δ1 = 0.8, the FN rate is non-zero at 0.14.
This is because, even with a narrow [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] band, some measurements
anomalous introduced by the ramp attack template escape detection. As the value of δ1
is increased from 0.8 to 0.99, the [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] band widens. With this, more
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anomalous measurements introduced by the ramp attack template escape detection. This
can be observed with the spike in FN rate after δ1 = 0.85. Scaling attack measurements
are detected for all values of δ1.
The value of δ2, which represents the maximum tolerated cumulative ACE variation
the period of operation, was varied between 0.01 to 0.08. At a value of δ2 = 0.01, the FN
rate is 0.015. At this point, the algorithm fails to detect some anomalous measurements
introduced by scaling attack. As the value of δ2 is increased, more anomalies introduced
by the scaling attack template are not detected. At a value of δ2 = 0.05, all the anomalies
introduced by the scaling attack are missed. However, all anomalies introduced by ramp
attacks are identified at all points.
The analysis reveals that scaling and ramp attacks are identified at all values of δ1 by rule
1 and δ2 by rule 2. However, the FP rates are least in the region δ1 > 0.92 and δ2 > 0.049.
Hence, for this period of operation, the anomaly detection engine should be set to δ1 = 0.92
and δ2 = 0.049 for the best performance. Similar analysis for the period 1PM −2PM resulted
in δ1 = 0.94 and δ2 = 0.05.
4.5.2 Online Performance Analysis
The attack dataset that was used to test online performance involved measurements cor-
rupted with scaling and ramp parameters of λs = 0.05 and λr = 0.0024. This is justified as the
attacker would have identified these values as the most impactful and stealthy. In this section,
we present results from the operation of attack-resilient AGC during attacks. The principle of
operation is that when an anomaly is detected, model-based AGC is employed until the end of
the hour. It is assumed that during this time, the source of the cyber threat is identified and
negated. At the end of the hour, AGC returns to the traditional measurement-based operation.
Performance during True Positives: i) Mitigation of Scaling Attacks: Fig. 4.13 shows
system performance during the scaling attack period. The anomaly detection engine is suc-
cessful in identifying the scaling attack through the ACE forecast calculated at 10.00 AM. The
algorithm calculated the value for ACEmin and ACEmax as −0.0070 and 0.0065, respectively,
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Figure 4.13 Frequency Performance during Scaling Attacks.
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based on δ1 = 0.92. However, the scaling attack forces the calculated real-time ACE to 0.0282,
which is not within the range defined by [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ]. Hence the field measurements
for rest of the hour are marked anomalous and the AGC operation is carried out based on real-
time load forecasts. From Fig. 4.13 it is observed that the model-based mitigation is effective
in maintaining system frequency within reasonable limits.
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Figure 4.14 Frequency Performance during Ramp Attacks.
ii) Mitigation of Ramp Attacks: Fig. 4.14 shows the frequency performance of the system
during the ramp attack period (1-4 PM). It is observed that the actual system frequency,
indicated by the solid line, deviates initially for some period of time before returning to 60Hz.
This is because, the anomaly detection algorithm is able to identify ramp attacks only after
observing a series of measurements to determine the algebraic sum of ACE. Once the attack is
identified, AGC is operated for the next hour based on the real-time load forecast.
For the first hour of the ramp attack, between 1-2 PM, the algebraic sum of ACE from
the forecast (ACEF ) was determined to be −0.0002 pu. With the inclusion of the tolerance
bound given by δ2 = 0.050, the acceptable range of algebraic ACE sum is between −0.0502 pu
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and 0.0498 pu. However, the algebraic sum of ACE during real-time operation for the same
hour was determined to be 0.0595 pu, which is outside the acceptable limit. This anomaly
triggers model-based AGC operation for the next hour. From Fig. 4.14, it is observed that the
frequency deviation is arrested and the brought back to acceptable values for the next hour
during the attack period.
Performance during False Positives: During the simulation, the anomaly detection
algorithm identified a true measurement as an anomaly. A real-time ACE of −0.0071 was
generated at around 6.14 AM . However, the [ACEFmin , ACEFmax ] range was evaluated to
be [−0.0065, 0.0070] for this period of operation. This triggered unwarranted model-based
mitigation. Fig. 4.15 shows the frequency performance of the system during this period. It is
observed that there is a difference in frequency performance when model-based AGC is used.
However, the system frequency is still maintained within acceptable limits.
06:00 06:08 06:17 06:25 06:34 06:42 06:51 07:00
59.8
59.85
59.9
59.95
60
60.05
60.1
60.15
60.2
60.25
Time (HH:MM)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(H
z)
Performance of Attack Resilient Control during False Positives
 
 
With Mitigation
True Measurements
Figure 4.15 Frequency Performance during False Positives.
102
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed the impacts of data integrity attacks on AGC operation. It
was observed that scaling, ramp, replay, pulse and random attacks severely affected power
system stability and market operation. We proposed the notion of attack resilient control as a
combination of smart attack detection and mitigation. The idea was to develop detection and
mitigation techniques based on knowledge of power system operation. The idea was extended to
an attack resilient AGC that detects malicious data injection based on real-time load forecasts.
The performance of the anomaly detection algorithm was measured in terms of false positive
and negative rates and the performance of the mitigation was observed through frequency per-
formance of the power system. Results from simulation studies have shown that the algorithm
is efficient in mitigating attacks and maintaining the system within safe operating bounds. Our
future work includes developing mitigation strategies for attacks that impact electricity market
operation through AGC and coordinated cyber attacks on power system control.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The importance of secure electric power grid operation to national safety and economic
vitality makes it a profitable target for threat actors looking to cause damage. The SCADA
system, through its vast computing and networking infrastructure provides these threat actors
with a large attack surface to achieve their objectives through cyber attacks. This thesis
explores two such powerful attack vectors that could cause significant impact to power system
reliability.
The first component of the thesis focusses on coordinated cyber attacks attacks that target
multiple power system components. The weaknesses in existing power system planning and
operation strategies were highlighted through simulation studies that showed the impact of
these attacks in terms of transmission line overloads and forced load shedding. The notion of
temporal and spatial coordinated cyber attacks was also introduced. Solution to this problem
was addressed at two levels planning and operations. A systematic risk modeling framework
for coordinated cyber attacks was proposed as mitigation for power system planning. The
risk from an attack vector was defined as the product of the vulnerability of the targeted
substation SCADA network and the impact that can result from its success. The framework
then identifies the most critical attack vectors by ranking them according to the calculated risk.
This framework provides power system operators with a methodology to identify the required
infrastructural upgrade paths and cyber security enhancements.
An enhancement to the EMS contingency analysis application was proposed as the online
solution. The goal of the algorithm was to efficiently identify impactful coordinated attack
vectors that impact a specific line during online operation. The algorithm takes advantage
of basic electric power system physics to significantly reduce the number combinations that
have to be evaluated to assess impact. The performance of the algorithm was compared to the
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performance of brute-force analyses, where all possible combinations are evaluated. Studies
performed with test power systems reveal that the proposed algorithm identifies all impactful
coordinated attack vectors for most transmission lines. This solution could be used by system
operators to quickly identify mitigation strategies for imminent attacks.
The second component of this thesis focussed on the impacts of data integrity attacks
on power system stability. Specifically, the impact of data integrity attacks on automatic
generation control is studied. It is shown that malicious measurement injections can cause
AGC performance to degrade and result in large frequency violations in the system. Attack
resilient control was proposed as a solution to detect and mitigate such attacks. Attack resilient
uses a combination of domain-specific anomaly detection algorithm that employs short-term
load forecasts to estimate AGC performance and compares real-time performance to this trusted
baseline. Any deviation from anticipated behavior is marked as an anomaly model-based AGC
engaged until trust is re-established. The results show that proposed solution is successful in
defending the system against such attacks, thereby maintaining reliability.
The complete protection of the electric power grid cannot be accomplished with a single
solution. Protection can only be achieved through a combination of solutions that include attack
prevention, detection, deterrence, mitigation, response and recovery. Cyber security researchers
need to address the challenges associated with adapting potent IT security solutions to ICS
networks. These technologies offer the first line of defense and will be adequate to fend against
the most common threats from less potent attackers. Smart attackers with access to resources
might have the ability to bypass these measures. This is where the role of personnel with
physical system knowledge, that is, system planners and operators, becomes critical. Power
system planners have to become cognizant of the potential impacts from cyber threats and
develop planning approaches that accommodate such events. System operators have to be
trained to identify cyber attack scenarios and equipped with smart EMS tools that detect,
analyze and mitigate imminent and successful attacks. The following section concludes this
thesis by identifying relevant future work.
105
5.1 Future Work
• Risk Analysis Framework - Future work includes developing a risk analysis framework that
includes other types of coordinated attacks targeting other power system components. For
example, a coordinated attack could involve simultaneous modification of the reference
setting on multiple VAR compensation devices. Such an attack would most significantly
impact system voltages. The risk analysis framework should have the capability to com-
pare impacts measured using different metrics and rank order them according to severity.
A comprehensive risk analysis is one that measures and compares impact from all types
of attack vectors targeting all possible power system targets. A planning methodology
based around such a process would significantly improve resilience.
• Cyber Contingency Analysis - Future work for this component should involve developing
other spatial and temporal attack vectors constructed from attacks of other types - DoS,
timing, etc. Also, the impact from these attacks on power system transient stability
should also be studied. The cyber contingency analysis algorithms proposed in this
thesis should be tested on larger and more realistic power systems. Finally, mitigation
for temporal attacks explored in this paper also has to be addressed.
• Attack Resilient Control - Future work includes identifying a methodology to differentiate
between abnormal measurements due to cyber attacks and legitimate aberrations due
to contingencies such as faults. Also, a methodology that could use of forecast-aided
measurements for compromised sensors and actual system measurements for trustworthy
sensors should be explored. Finally, the proposed solution should also be validated on
larger and more realistic power systems.
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